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Abstract 
This dissertation analyzes corporate-community conflicts around extractive 
industries in Guatemala with the purpose of better understanding how environmental 
struggles emerge and take shape. The study uses environmental governance as a 
framework to analyze the processes, institutions, actors and discourses that shape the 
conditions of possibility of political action and mobilization in environmental struggles. 
The dissertation argues that to understand the conditions of possibility of political action 
and mobilization in environmental struggles we must study the interplay between 
political actions ‘from above’ and ‘from below,’ which are seen as dialectically 
interrelated, with dynamic and contested interactions between actors within and between 
scales.  
Environmental struggles are understood as part of emergent forms of scalar 
politics wherein different actors struggle to (re)consolidate power and authority in the 
hands of competing groups. The complex ways in which corporate-elite-government-
military networks shape political actions in environmental conflicts intersects with the 
strategies of grassroots movements, who themselves are engaged in multi-scalar 
contentious politics. Spatialities shape the conditions of possibility for political action. 
They matter for the imaginaries, material practices and emergent trajectories of 
environmental struggles. By examining the shifting spatialities of political actions we can 
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reveal the articulations of emergent power relations and make visible some of the power 
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Chapter One:  Environmental governance, extractive industries and struggles 
for environmental justice in Guatemala 
1. Introduction  
I did not know that I would end up working in Guatemala when I started the PhD 
program at the Department of Geography and the Environment at the University of 
Denver. My master’s thesis had focused on issues relating to changing land tenure in 
coastal Nicaragua and I had always thought I would continue working in Nicaragua, at 
least in some capacity. I was headed to Nicaragua for a return visit in November 2014 
and decided to make a quick stop in Guatemala on the way.  
I did not know much about the history of Guatemala before I got there. I knew 
that the country had experienced a horrific 36-year long war, which had produced some 
of Latin America’s most terrible instances of state terror that culminated in acts of 
genocide. I would later find out that counterinsurgency warfare saw more than 200,000 
people murdered during the war, the vast majority of which were non-combatant 
indigenous Maya. Another 50,000 people were disappeared, their whereabouts unknown 
and their bodies buried in clandestine graves throughout the country.  
I also knew that conflicts relating to extractive industries and hydropower 
development were spreading throughout the country, and that these conflicts were 
becoming increasingly violent. The civil war ended with the signing of the Peace Accords 
in 1996 during a period when the government negotiated different free trade agreement
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and changed legislation to attract foreign investment, and extractive industries were one 
of the economic sectors strongly promoted by the government.  
People in post-war societies are marked for a long time by their experiences with 
terror and death, but also, many governing practices that emerge during civil wars are 
difficult to eradicate. Environmental struggles in Guatemala are historically contingent, 
embedded in a post-war context and must be understood against this backdrop. As such, 
one of the things I pay particular attention to in my dissertation is how the civil war 
shapes conflicts surrounding extractive industries.  
Before that first trip to Guatemala I had learned about an unfolding situation 
surrounding a Canadian mining project in southeastern Guatemala, where only the year 
before my arrival the conflict had reached a boiling point. Communities affected by the 
mining project had started to organize against the mine a few years earlier, frustrated with 
lack of transparency and their exclusion form decision-making processes, and worried 
about the potential environmental impacts of the mine. The Canadian company had 
become increasingly unhappy with local opposition to the mine and demanded that the 
government take action to protect the company’s investments.  
In May 2013, then President, Otto Perez Molina declared a ‘state of siege’ in the 
areas surrounding the mine, deploying thousands of troops and police to the area. The 
repression was harsh and the criminalization that would follow effective. Anti-mining 
movement leaders had arrest warrants issued against them and soldiers and police officers 
raided activists’ homes. Many were arrested, while others fled into hiding. Perez Molina, 
a former special-ops army general, justified the state of siege – which can be likened to 
martial law – on grounds of terrorism and drug trafficking threats. 
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The logic of the civil war and the counterinsurgency warfare that characterized it, 
so deeply embedded within the Guatemalan state, continue to shape the ways in which 
the government and industry react to contentious environmental politics, often by 
portraying activists in the same ways as adversaries during the war, justifying corporate 
counterinsurgency, repression and criminalization against them.  
Examining how government, corporations and elites react to opposition ‘from 
below’ against extractive industries became a main focus of my dissertation. However, I 
also observed that the ways in which grassroots movements mobilize against extractive 
projects influences responses ‘from above.’ In my dissertation, I argue that to understand 
political action in environmental struggles we must study the interplay between political 
actions ‘from above’ and ‘from below,’ which I see as dynamic and contested 
interactions between actors within and between scales. Environmental struggles are part 
of emergent forms of politics where different actors struggles to consolidate power and 
authority in the hands of competing groups in and through the environment.  
This then was the context in which I decided to visit the areas surrounding the 
mine for the first time. Early one morning I set out to meet with members of the anti-
mining movement in the Departments of Santa Rosa and Jalapa. I met with members of 
the ‘Parliament of the Xinka People of Guatemala’, who despite their right to prior 
consultation as established by the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) Indigenous 
and Tribal Peoples Convention number 169, which Guatemala ratified in 1996, were 
never consulted prior to the installment of the mine. This would later result in the 
suspension of the mine’s exploitation license when Guatemalan courts recognized the 
Xinka peoples right to consultation as established by the Convention.  
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Later I would also meet people who had escaped on foot through the mountains 
when soldiers and police came to arrest them during the state of siege, others who had 
been forewarned by neighbors and managed to escape but nonetheless had their homes 
raided and their children and families terrorized. I met people who had been kidnapped, 
who had been shot by the mine’s private security, others who had been arbitrarily 
arrested and jailed for months without trial, others who had lost their children. Families 
and neighbors no longer speaking to each other because some were pro-mining while 
others were anti-mining.  
That same day I also went to San Rafael Las Flores, where the mine itself is 
located. However, once in San Rafael, I was asked if I’d be willing to go to the next 
town, Mataquescuintla or Colís as the locals know it, because it was safer and it would be 
easier to talk there. Colís, unlike San Rafael, had declared itself as against mining, having 
successfully carried out a community referendum on mining, which the Guatemalan High 
Court had recognized as legally binding in 2013 – the first time ever in Guatemalan 
history.  
Driving into Colís we saw big signs saying ‘No a la minería!’ – ‘No to mining’ 
and even though there were soldiers on patrol throughout the small city the atmosphere 
already felt a little lighter than in San Rafael. The Colíseños told me the story of how 
they had organized a municipal referendum on the mining project and of the pushback 
they had experienced from the mining industry and the government, and the following 
state of siege. They explained that in Colís they had the support of their mayor, whereas 
in San Rafael Las Flores the mayor, who was pro-mining, had refused to authorize a 
municipal referendum.  
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The issue of the community referendums and how anti-mining activists 
increasingly deploy legal strategies as part of their political and social struggles became 
another focus of my dissertation. In Guatemala, anti-mining activists increasingly use 
‘the law’ to expand the political spaces available to them for transformative politics. 
Different types of community referendums have become one of the most common tools 
for resisting mining. Through these mechanisms, grassroots movements have 
increasingly been able to assert the rights of mining-affected communities and indigenous 
peoples to self-determination in environmental decision-making and natural resource 
management.  
I was moved by the sense of urgency of the people I met on this initial visit to 
Guatemala: ‘the world needs to know about this’ they said. Their resilience, their hope, 
and their fighting spirit inspired me. In particular, I was inspired by their willingness to 
defy all odds against an insurmountably strong industry and a State with a long history of 
rural repression. And so it was that I came to fall in love with Guatemala. I left 
Guatemala that December 2014 knowing without a doubt that I would be back and that 
my doctoral research would focus on the environmental struggles emerging in response to 
extractive industries. 
Five years later, I remain inspired as ever by the people of Guatemala and by their 
tenacity. I am inspired by the innovative ways in which grassroots actors have been able 
to pry open the political spaces they have historically been excluded from. Through their 
efforts they are increasingly able to obtain recognition and assert the rights of affected 
communities to self-determination in environmental decision-making processes. In doing 
so, they attempt to push open new spaces for participation, recognition and distribution in 
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order to access environmental justice. They increasingly unsettle the legitimacy of 
dominant ideas about development and human-environment relations, and in small ways, 
they subvert hegemonic power relations in environmental struggles. 
2. Background and context 
Since the early 2000s, environmental conflicts stemming from the expansion of 
extractive industries have proliferated throughout Guatemala. This expansion relates to 
changes in the global geography of resource extraction, which are the result of the greatly 
expanding metabolism of societies consuming ever more energy and material resources 
(Martínez-Alier, 2002). The liberalization of economic policies, natural resource laws 
and investment codes, the financialization of many commodity markets, and historically 
low domestic interest rates, coupled with a decade of high commodity prices, 
deregulation and technological innovations have allowed corporations to advance the 
commodity frontier, moving ever greater quantities of soil and water (Bridge, 2004). 
Industry technological advances have also made natural resources accessible that were 
previously not economically viable (Mudd, 2007). Companies go deeper and farther into 
more ecologically and often socially vulnerable areas to extract resources. Often, these 
areas are inhabited communities, many of them indigenous, who most suffer the burdens 
of environmental degradation and pollution, and lack of access to basic resources due to 
the unequal distribution of power and income, and social inequalities of ethnicity, social 
class, caste and gender (Conde, 2017). While economic growth and the increasing social 
metabolism of society, coupled with neoliberal reforms are some of the reasons behind 
the expansion of the resource extraction, what causes conflicts to emerge are the socio-
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environmental impacts on land, water and livelihoods coupled with the exclusion of 
affected communities from decision-making processes (Conde, 2017; Conde & Le Billon, 
2017).  
In Guatemala, unprecedented environmental struggles led by strong grassroots 
movements have emerged in response to the expansion of extractive industries. These 
grassroots movements include some of the most marginalized social groups in Guatemala 
– indigenous people and the rural poor. Issues of water scarcity, pollution and loss of 
farmland often lie at the core of these conflicts. Resistance to extractive industries 
addresses a range of interrelated concerns, including claims to political autonomy; the 
rights to land and territory; the unjust burden of environmental risk and degradation; the 
politics of livelihoods; and cultural survival. More broadly, these movements question 
ideas and visions of development that they feel dispossess and exclude them, and express 
discontent over the unequal distribution of socio-environmental benefits and burdens 
stemming from extractive projects (Hall et al., 2015). The people involved in these 
struggles use a wide array of strategies and tactics to resist extractive projects. They 
organize community referendums, stage demonstrations and set up blockades. They 
mobilize transnational activist networks and collaborate with international non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and religious groups. Activists also increasingly use 
legal discourses and mechanisms as part of their political and social struggles, using ‘the 
law’ to expand the political spaces available to them for transformative politics.   
Social and environmental injustices are rampant in Guatemala, and environmental 
struggles take place in a post-war context characterized by racism, fragile justice, 
pervasive impunity and great structural inequality. Those who engage in resistance 
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against extractive projects are faced with an unsettling climate of hostility and violence, 
and experience repression and criminalization aimed at undermining their activism, and 
reports indicate that killings of environmental activists are on the rise (Global Witness, 
2017).  
3. Conceptualizing environmental struggles in Guatemala   
Environmental struggles in Guatemala are historically contingent, embedded in a 
post-war context and must be understood against this backdrop. Guatemala’s thirty-six 
year long civil war, which lasted from 1960 to 1996, produced some of Latin America’s 
most terrible instances of state terror that culminated in acts of genocide. 
Counterinsurgency warfare saw more than 200,000 people murdered during the war, the 
vast majority of which were non-combatant indigenous Maya. Another 50,000 people 
were disappeared, their whereabouts unknown and their bodies buried in clandestine 
graves throughout the country (Brett, 2016; CEH, 2012; ODAH, 1998). The widespread 
operationalization of disappearances became a signature tactic of the Guatemalan military 
and was used to terrorize, punish and silence the civilian population. The signing of the 
Peace Accords in 1996, which marked the end of the war, did little to address many of 
the root causes of the civil war, such as inequality, highly skewed land distribution, 
deeply rooted racism and the exclusion of the indigenous population from meaningful 
civil and political participation (Sveinsdóttir, Aguilar-Støen, and Bull, forthcoming). 
Drawing inspiration from the work of Brett (2016) and Sundberg (2008), I argue that in 
order to understand contemporary environmental struggles in Guatemala two specific 
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factors must be taken into account: 1) the logic counterinsurgency and 2) the logic of 
racism, and how these factors shape the conditions of political action and mobilization.    
3.1. The logic of counterinsurgency  
Guatemala’s state crafting project was one that combined democracy with anti-
communist counterinsurgency, which built on long-evolving patterns of rural repression 
(Grandin, 2011). In the words of General Gramajo, quoted by Jennifer Schirmer (1998, p. 
1): “in Guatemala, a democracy was born out of the womb of a counterinsurgency 
campaign.” To this day counterinsurgency structures remain incorporated into the very 
heart of the Guatemalan state and continue to condition individual and collective actions. 
A main factor driving the political violence that culminated in the mass atrocities 
committed against indigenous non-combatants was the counterinsurgency objective of 
‘draining the bowl to kill the fish’ (Brett, 2016; Sanford, 2003; Schirmer, 1998). 
Particularly under President Lucas García and de facto president General Efraín Ríos 
Montt, between 1981 and 1983, a ‘scorched earth’ campaign of extraordinary brutality 
was waged, including eradicating entire communities, systematic massacres against 
indigenous populations, homicides, torture, mass public rape and forced sterilization, the 
burning of crops and the killings of livestock to ‘starve out’ the insurgents (Brett, 2016, p. 
57).  
Despite the official disappearance of the counterinsurgency state, 
counterinsurgency has become common sense among large factions of Guatemalans, for 
whom the lack of empathy forwards the victims of state terror has become normalized 
(Flores, 2017). The logic of counterinsurgency, so deeply embedded within the 
Guatemalan state, shapes the way in which the government and elites react to contentious 
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environmental politics, often by portraying activists in the same ways as adversaries 
during the war, justifying corporate counterinsurgency, repression and criminalization 
against them, issues which are discussed in chapter 2 of this dissertation.  
3.2. The logic of racism  
Though the conflict in Guatemala reflected the anti-communist logic of the 
region’s Cold War, it was also shaped by the longer-term logic of embedded racism that 
served to organize unequal socio-spatial relations in colonial and postcolonial Guatemala 
(Brett, 2016; Casaús Arzú, 2010). As the counterinsurgency state sought to exterminate 
the guerrilla’s support base, which was allegedly situated within indigenous and peasant 
communities, it simultaneously sought to annihilate all vestiges of indigenous selfhood 
(Brett, 2016, p. 2).  
A wealth of research highlights the ways in which the ideology of racism is a 
central axis of national life in Guatemala (Brett, 2016; Casaús Arzú, 2010; Nelson, 1999, 
2015; Sundberg, 2008). Systems of hierarchical racialization were central to colonial rule 
(Quijano, 2000), and Spanish colonial policies and administrative legacies left an 
enduring imprint on governance, cultural practice, and human-environment relations in 
Guatemala (Sundberg, 2008, p. 569). Although the European colonists encountered 
diverse groups of people with differing languages, economies and governance structures, 
the conquest led to a process of social homogenization, creating the unified categories of 
“Spaniards” and “Indios” where none had previously existed (Quijano, 2000). A third 
group was soon added to the mix: “Negros” made up of African slaves and their 
descendants. Not only did the colonial legal system divide people into racial categories, it 
also defined their differing rights and responsibilities accordingly, including what jobs 
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they were eligible for, whether they could pursue formal education, where they could 
live, and whether or not they had access to natural resources. Racial thinking then 
informed the ways in which the new Latin American republics codified citizenship, and 
racial hierarchies came to form the structures of the postcolonial social order and the 
modern state (Sundberg, 2008, p. 571). 
Sundberg (2008) argues that while complex and fluid systems of racial 
categorization emerged in the colonial era to describe the many outcomes of racial 
mixing, Europeanness/whiteness formed the core of such systems. In ‘postcolonial’ Latin 
America, hegemonic nation-building projects were organized around and privileged 
whiteness. White supremacy and white privilege inform legal systems, and everyday 
understandings of self and other, as well as the organization of space, place and 
environmental formations. 
3.3. Situating race in environmental struggles   
In Guatemala, race1 has been a central factor in demarcating legal access to rights 
and resources since the colonial era. While biological and cultural traits have long been 
recognized as primary elements in delineating racial hierarchies in Latin America, 
human-environment relations have been relatively neglected. Juanita Sundberg argues 
that systems of racialization have drawn upon and come into being through 
‘environmental formations’, that is, the historically contingent articulations between 
                                                
1 I use the term race when referring to “a contingent historical phenomenon that has varied over 
time and space” and racialization to refer to the “process of marking human differences 
according to hierarchical discourses” (Appelbaum et al., 2003, p. 2). I understand racial 




environmental imaginaries2, natural resource allocation and political economies. 
According to Sundberg, analyzing how race articulates with environmental formations to 
shape socio-spatial relations allows us to understand how environmental injustices are 
organized, justified, but also reconfigured (2008, p. 569). An analytical lens such as 
Sundberg’s provokes new questions about the ways in which exclusionary discourses and 
practices work in and through the environment. 
Processes of racialization articulate in and through ideas about nature and 
appropriate natural resource practices and vice versa. They are rarely incidental to the 
access and control of natural resources, predominant visions of appropriate land use, 
exposure to environmental risk, access to environmental benefits (clean air, water, fertile 
soils), and who counts in environmental policy making. Sundberg argues that 
environmental justice, as an approach will be significantly enriched if we historicize 
racialization in particular places. Understanding contemporary discourses and practices 
depends upon analysing how actors draw from and reinterpret historically constructed 
categories in the context of specific nation-building projects, legal frameworks, daily 
discourses and practice, and environmental formations (Sundberg, 2008, p. 579).    
Hegemonic visions of nature and appropriate human-environment relations are 
shaped by, and in turn shape, racial hierarchies, which justify and fix unequal social 
relations at multiple and intersecting scales (Sundberg, 2008). As such, natural resource 
management practices, environmental governance and their regulatory and legal contexts 
must be understood as racialized in ways that organize inequality. In Guatemala, 
                                                
2 By environmental imaginaries, Sundberg (2008, p. 579) refers to ideas about nature and 
appropriate human-environment relations, such as natural resource management and property 
regimes.  
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resistance against extractive projects is historically contingent and represents a struggle 
for socio-spatial relations and forms of governance that are not based on the 
normalization of racial inequality. 
4. Environmental governance as an analytical framework  
As an analytical framework environmental governance provides a tool for 
examining the complex and multi-scalar institutional arrangements, social practices and 
actors engaged in environmental decision making (Bridge & Perreault, 2009, p. 491). As 
a concept environmental governance is more popular than precise. It has been deployed 
in a myriad of ways to describe and to occasionally critique the institutional arrangements 
of state, market and civil society through which decisions about environment and 
resources are made. Bridge and Perreault (2009) have argued that environmental 
governance articulates the economic with the political, shedding light on the relationships 
between institutional capacities and social action. In doing so, the term problematizes 
state-centric understandings of power and highlights the role of non-state actors – NGOs, 
supra-national agencies, social movements, or private firms – in allocating, 
administrating and regulating environments and resources. Governance occurs at multiple 
scales that extend beyond those of formal institutions to include practices and norms 
through which key categories – nature, environment, citizens and resources – are 
contested, affirmed and reproduced.  
In my understanding of environmental governance, I draw on the analytical 
framework advanced by Bridge and Perrault and I adopt Bull and Aguilar-Støen’s (2015, 
p. 5) definition of the term, which understands environmental governance as “the set of 
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mechanisms, formal and informal institutions and practices by which social order is 
produced through controlling that which is related to the environment and natural 
resources.” Such an understanding allows for a broader conceptualization of 
environmental governance and looks past an environmental managerialism that is 
unreflexive about the dynamics of power, divergence and conflict that inhere in the 
process of managing resources and the environment, and which often masks competing 
claims to, and about, the environment. In my view, environmental governance describes 
an institutional arrangement that is not only a sociospatial configuration: it is also, and 
fundamentally, a representation of – and resource for – political and economic power 
operating on and through the control of the environment. Because the institutions, 
organizations and relations of environmental governance are inherently power-laden, 
analyses of environmental governance should aim to lay bare these power geometries, 
and interrogate their origins and implications (Bridge & Perreault, 2009, p. 492).  
5. Summary and structure of the dissertation  
My dissertation, in its broadest sense, set out to better understand how 
environmental struggles emerge and take shape. In particular, the dissertation analyzes 
the processes, institutions, actors and discourses that shape the conditions of possibility 
for political action and mobilization in environmental struggles. I argue that to 
understand the conditions of possibility for political action in environmental struggles we 
must study the interplay between political actions from above and from below, which is 
what I have tried to do throughout the dissertation. I argue that environmental struggles 
are part of emergent forms of politics wherein different actors struggle to consolidate 
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power and authority in the hands of competing groups. The complex ways in which 
corporate-elite-government-military networks shape political actions in environmental 
conflicts intersects with the strategies of grassroots movements, who themselves are 
engaged in multi-scalar contentious politics.  
To understand uneven development, unjust social relations, and environmental 
conflicts, we must ground these processes historically and geographically by tracing the 
historical processes, legal and institutional infrastructures, and socially implicated 
assumptions and discourses that typically make unjust outcomes the rule rather than the 
exception. By examining the shifting constellations of political actions from both above 
and below we are able to reveal the articulations of emergent power relations and make 
visible some of the power geometries in environmental struggles.  
In addition to this introduction and a concluding chapter, which presents a 
summary of the dissertation’s main arguments, the dissertation comprises of three articles 
that are written as distinct manuscripts intended for publication in peer-reviewed journals.  
The first article, “This is not a game”: Shaping political actions ‘from above’ in 
environmental conflicts in Guatemala, is co-authored with Dr. Mariel Aguilar-Støen and 
Dr. Benedicte Bull at the Centre for Development and the Environment at the University 
of Oslo. This article examines how government, corporations and elites in Guatemala 
shape decisions, practices, and interactions that influence political actions ‘from above’ 
in environmental conflicts. In the paper, we analyse how the private sector and the 
government respond to opposition against extractive industries. Responses include tactics 
and strategies that range from criminalisation and repression of activism to publicity 
campaigns and lobbying. However, we observe that the ways in which social movements 
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resist also influence responses ‘from above,’ e.g. legal and technical contestations to 
environmental and social standards, community referendums, civil disobedience etc. We 
ask: 1) what types of resources are mobilised within government-corporate networks in 
response to resistance to the advancement of extractive industries, and 2) how do tactics 
used by social movements influence responses ‘from above'? We contend that the private 
sector and government engage in practices that aim to undermine and suppress opposition 
to extractive industries, and to make extractive operations politically and socially 
legitimate. Activists are increasingly portrayed in the same way as adversaries during the 
civil war, justifying counterinsurgency and repression against them, while paradoxically, 
corporations claim commitment to international human rights standards, such as the 
ILO’s Convention 169, and to engage in ‘community development’ and ‘social 
responsibility.’ 
The second article, From the streets to the courts: Mobilizing the law to subvert 
hegemonic power relations in environmental struggles, is co-authored with Dr. Mariel 
Aguilar-Støen. This article examines the growing importance of law, legal institutions 
and legal actors in environmental struggles. In doing so, we wish to get at the complex 
and dynamic interweaving of law, space, politics and power in struggles for 
environmental justice. More specifically, we analyze the ways in which grassroots actors 
mobilize the law in attempts to subvert hegemonic norms and power relations in 
environmental struggles. We argue that due to lack of adequate political spaces to 
advance environmental struggles, activists have turned to the judiciary as a strategy to 
expand their repertoires of contention. In doing so, they attempt to push open new spaces 
for participation, recognition and distribution to access environmental justice. 
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The emerging legal strategies adopted by environmental activists in Guatemala 
highlight how the many dynamic configurations of environmental struggles are related to 
legal processes in lieu of political spaces. The legal cultures we observe in Guatemalan 
environmental struggles raise important questions about the dialectics of resistance and 
the law, and how these processes shape environmental governance, political participation 
and contestation. Those who engage in resistance against extractive projects are faced 
with a climate of hostility and violence, and experience repression and criminalization 
aimed at undermining their activism. Despite this, we find that environmental struggles in 
Guatemala reveal how grassroots mobilizations can - however modestly - subvert 
hegemonic power relations in their struggles for environmental justice and transformative 
politics.      
The third article, Corporate community conflicts in Guatemala: Exploring private 
sector perspectives on opposition to mining, explores the discourses of Guatemalan 
business leaders and economic elites to analyze how the private sector explains and 
understands corporate-community mining conflicts in the country. I analyse discourses 
emerging from interviews with ‘the private sector’, wherein business leaders and 
economic elites discussed their thoughts on socio-environmental conflicts and what they 
see as the main challenges currently facing the extractive sector in Guatemala. In 
focusing on private sector discourses my aim is to advance a better understanding of how 
responses to mining opposition take shape, and the ways in which such discourses 
contribute to establishing the conditions of possibility of political action in environmental 
conflicts.  
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The analysis presented in the dissertation draws on data gathered through 
fieldwork in Guatemala between 2014-2017, using qualitative research methods such as 
interviews, participant observation and document analysis. My analysis includes 
perspectives from a wide range of diverse actors, including indigenous leaders, 
environmental activists, and rural smallholding farmers involved in anti-extractive 
movements, as well as legal advisors representing them, and allied organizations. I also 
interviewed corporate representatives from transnational mining companies, 
multinational conglomerates and agro-industrial organizations. I also interviewed leaders 
of business associations and industrial business networks, board members of umbrella 
associations promoting private sector interests, as well as powerful political and 
economic elites. Between 2014-2017, forty-nine interviews were conducted. Participant 
observation included visits to two different project sites; one a mineral mine, the other a 
cement plant, as well as participation in private sector conferences, anti-extractive 
demonstrations, meetings and public court hearings.
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Chapter Two: Methodological approach 
The analysis presented in the dissertation draws on data gathered through 
fieldwork in Guatemala between 2014-2017, using qualitative research methods such as 
interviews, participant observation and document analysis. The decision to use qualitative 
research was based on the findings of my exploratory research. My research process 
began with exploratory research in Guatemala from 2014 until 2016. During four 
separate trips I conducted interviews and was able to identify key issues, actors, and 
processes that play a role in conflicts relating to natural resource extraction in the 
country. Exploratory research between 2014 and 2016 played an important part in the 
design of my study. The information gathered through exploratory research gave me an 
overview and understanding of the corporate-community conflicts surrounding extractive 
industries in Guatemala. This allowed for the progress of my research design to be 
unfolding in nature, and letting empirical findings guide the development of the study’s 
design. This does not imply an “anything goes” strategy. Qualitative research has an 
inherent openness and flexibility that allows you to modify your design and focus during 
the research to understand new discoveries and relationships (Maxwell, 2013). 
Exploratory research enabled me to affirm that the type of approach I had in mind was 
both appropriate and feasible. I confirmed that my Spanish was adequate to be able to 
conduct interviews and that I would able to gain access to my desired participants, and
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that in-depth interviews and participant observation are an appropriate method for data 
collection.  
2.1 Data collection and exploratory research 
To collect the information needed for my study I used in-depth interviewing, 
participant observation, and analysis of texts and documents. I brought together the 
information from these different sources in a process of triangulation in order to balance 
the strengths and weaknesses of these different methods and the information they 
produce. I collected information from a wide range of different actors, including 
indigenous leaders, environmental activists, and rural smallholding farmers involved in 
anti-extractive movements, as well as legal advisors representing them, and allied 
organizations. I also interviewed corporate representatives from transnational mining 
companies, multinational conglomerates and agro-industrial organizations. I also 
interviewed leaders of business associations and industrial business networks, board 
members of umbrella associations promoting private sector interests, as well as powerful 
political and economic elites. Between 2014-2017, forty-nine interviews were conducted. 
Participant observation included visits to two different project sites; one a mineral mine, 
the other a cement plant, as well as participation in private sector conferences, anti-
extractive demonstrations, meetings and public court hearings. 
Gaining access to the participants and settings that I used as sources of 
information is a process that began with my ongoing exploratory fieldwork in 2014. 
During exploratory research in 2015 I conducted in-depth interviews and participant 
observation with participants from the anti-extractive movement. The preliminary 
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findings from this exploratory research highlighted the need to study the role of the state-
elite nexus in resource extraction to better understand the dynamics of violence that 
surround these sectors. This is supported by research that indicates that not only is this 
nexus understudied but also because the choices and actions of elites affect the 
centralization of power in the state, the ability to extract resources from society, and the 
establishment of a monopoly on legitimate force. These are all pre-requisites for the 
emergence of a state that in turn can take on distributive functions and create a sense of 
integrated community and citizenship (Bull, 2014). Gathering information from the 
private sector, government officials, and the elites is important for several reasons. These 
groups are currently understudied in Guatemala and what information exists about them 
usually comes from secondary sources so that they tend to be blackboxed. Most existing 
research considers them monolithic. Finally, these groups are important because they are 
in position to formally or informally influence decisions and practices that have broad 
societal impact (Bull, 2014). 
I began the process of collecting information from the private sector and the elite 
in Guatemala during the summer of 2016. Gaining access to these participants was not 
without issue or unproblematic. Guatemala’s private sector and elite are very elusive and 
recently, given the often-critical spotlight under which resource industries have come in 
the country, they are very wary. However, through some good initial gatekeepers I was 
able to get the ball rolling and I was able to begin to make headway with several key 
informants. These were actors from the mining industry, from the agro-business industry, 
the hydropower industry, as well as several association and groups that promote and 
protect private sector interests. This initial access and relationship with this group of 
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participants was important, and affirmed that it is possible to gain access to the private 
sector and the elite.  
2.2. Data analysis  
In qualitative research, data analysis is a process of making meaning. It is a 
creative process, not a mechanical one (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). My data analysis 
strategy is one such of interpretation and I drew on my understanding of the context and 
ongoing discussion both in Guatemala and beyond.  
Analyzing qualitative data generally involves several stages. First, I began by 
arranging and organizing my data so that I was able to make sense of it. Margaret 
LeCompte and Jean Schensul (1999) call this the process of “tidying up.” I began by 
listening to all recordings of my interviews and reorganizing my observation notes. I 
made sure that all my taped interviews were transcribed verbatim and that my field notes 
were together and complete. I made a comprehensive list of all the materials that I 
gathered. Following this I began to immerse myself in my data and became familiar with 
what I had gathered. I then read the interview transcripts, observation notes, and the 
documents that I wanted to analyze. During this reading and listening, I wrote notes and 
memos on what I see and heard in my data and developed tentative ideas about categories 
and relationships. This was the beginning of determining patterns and regularities in my 
data. Following this began the process of making sense of my data. The first steps of this 
process were coding. In qualitative analysis, the goal of coding is to begin to focus on the 
potential meanings of ones data. Amanda Coffey and Paul Atkinson suggest that 
qualitative coding entails three basic procedures: “(a) noticing relevant phenomena, (b) 
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collecting examples of those phenomena, and (c) analyzing those phenomena in order to 
find commonalities, differences, patterns, and structures” (1996, p. 29).  
At each step of the way of my analysis I wrote up memos, both procedural ones 
and analytical ones. Procedural memos helped me remember how I did my coding, what 
kinds of categories I created, and so forth. These memos were important to help keep 
track of what I had done. Analytical memos helped me think about the categories and 
themes that I developed in my analysis. They helped me focus on what was important in 
my data and to make connections between cases. These memos contained my hunches 
and ideas and best guesses about what I should be thinking about. As I developed my 
coding further, these memos got more and more detailed (Esterberg, 2002). Coding 
serves the purpose of data compilation. Following data compilation came the process of 
developing an analysis, which included looking for patterns in the data (similarities and 
differences), comparing cases, building typologies, and conducting a content analysis 
(Esterberg, 2002). 
2.3. Positionality and the politics of fieldwork 
Fieldwork is undeniably important in Latin American geography, yet despite this 
importance there is an absence of a dialogue about the politics of fieldwork within the 
sub-discipline (Sundberg, 2003, 2005). Juanita Sundberg draws on feminist and post-
colonial theories about the production of knowledge to suggest that this silence about 
fieldwork is rooted in masculinist notions of objectivity that predominate Latin American 
geography. Sundberg has argued that critical geographies of Latin America must begin 
with an analysis of how and why the bodies and geographies of geographers 
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themselves matter. She argues for increased attention to the nexus of power and 
knowledge and in particular, to how researcher’s geographical location, social status, race 
and gender fundamentally shape the questions asked, the data collected, and the 
interpretation of the data (Sundberg, 2003). However, to focus on the geographer as a 
producer of knowledge is not to advocate the kind of navel gazing so abhorrent to many 
scholars. Rather, it is an effort to call attention to and critically assess how the 
geographer's embodied social position and geographic location inform the production of 
knowledge about and representations of Latin American people and nature (Sundberg, 
2005, p.17). 
Much like Juanita, I as a white woman conducting research in Guatemala have 
been made acutely aware of the ways in which my gender, race, and biography as a 
privileged Icelandic citizen and student at a private university in the United States shape 
all levels of my research. I have tried to reflect upon this as I try to situate myself as a 
critical, feminist geographer working in Latin America. In thinking about and doing 
research I try to be self-reflexive about my position (geographic location, social status, 
race, and gender) and to consider how power relations are embedded in the very 
interpretative nature of research. I see this as a political intervention and contribution to 
the broader goals of emancipatory politics shared by human geographers.   
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Chapter three: “This is not a game”: Shaping political actions 'from above' in 
environmental conflicts in Guatemala 
I. Introduction 
In an interview titled “This is not a game”,3 the president of the pro-military 
NGO, the “Foundation Against Terrorism” (Fundación Contra el Terrorismo -FCT), 
Ricardo Méndez-Ruiz, explained why his NGO and the private sector in Guatemala 
shared a common interest in reversing the results of the genocide trial against former 
dictator Ríos-Montt. According to Méndez-Ruiz, the private sector and the military are 
allies in a common fight because the post-war legal proceedings against the military not 
only threaten the military, but also the dominant position of the private sector and elites. 
This statement illustrates how the civil war, its violence, and the main parties involved 
are recurrent themes in contemporary Guatemalan society. In the interview, Méndez-Ruiz 
also mentioned land, agrarian issues and the extractive industries as being at risk from 
popular revolts.  
In this paper we study conflicts relating to extractive industries that have 
proliferated throughout rural areas in Guatemala since the early 2000s. In doing so, we 
show how the legacies of the civil war (1960-1996) shape the ways in which the private 
sector and the government react to contentious politics. The Peace Accords were never 
completely implemented and room for including “others” in dialogue, negotiations and in 
                                                
3 https://www.plazapublica.com.gt/content/esto-no-es-un-juego  
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decision-making remains limited. As a result, the private sector and the government are 
able to engage in practices that aim to undermine and suppress opposition to extractive 
industries, while at the same time trying to make extractive operations politically and 
socially legitimate for certain social groups. Activists are increasingly portrayed in 
similar ways as insurgents during the war, when the figure of the ‘internal enemy’ was 
central to normalizing counterinsurgency and genocide. This particular framing of 
opposition to extractive industries fosters a hostile climate that enables corporate 
counterinsurgency and state repression.  
In the early days of the peace talks the notion of “politics as a continuation of 
war” was put forward by former ministry of defense General Alejandro Gramajo, who in 
an interview told Jennifer Schrimer the following: 
Our strategic goal has been to reverse Clausewitz’s philosophy of war to state that in 
Guatemala, politics must be the continuation of war. But that does not mean that we 
are abandoning war; we are fighting it from a much broader horizon within a 
democratic framework. We may be renovating our methods of warfare but we are not 
abandoning them… we are continuing our [counterinsurgency] operations [against] 
international subversion because the Constitution demands it (Schirmer, 1998, p. 1) 
Central to the counterinsurgency campaign during the civil war were several 
programs that intended to reshape territories and people’s lives. Counterinsurgency 
campaigns took place in tandem with a series of public relations programs, the 
construction of infrastructure, the establishment of “model villages” and other programs 
designed to “win the hearts and minds of the population” (Interview with General 
Gramajo in Schimrer 1998; see also Gould, 2018). The civil war was not only a military 
project; it was political and economic, in the sense that it was a project designed to shape 
territories and space (Ybarra, 2012). We argue that responses ‘from above’ to 
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contemporary opposition against extractive industries can to some extent be understood 
as an extension of the “politics as a continuation of war”. As we will outline below, 
contemporary extractive conflicts in Guatemala are shaped by the post-war context in 
which they take place and are characterized by the continuation of many of the root 
causes of the war, such as inequality, a highly skewed distribution of land and exclusion 
of the indigenous population from civil and political participation.  
Our analysis draws on data gathered through fieldwork between 2013-2017 and 
focuses on four mining projects. We conducted interviews with corporate representatives, 
associations and groups that protect and promote private sector interests, lawyers, public 
servants, and Guatemalan elites. We interviewed actors engaged in resistance against 
extractive projects, legal advisors representing them, and allied organizations. Our 
research is also based on participant observation with the aforementioned actors and 
includes, for example, visits to projects sites and participation in private sector 
conferences, as well as participating in anti-extractive demonstrations, meetings and 
public court hearings.  
1.1. Theoretical considerations  
There is a growing body of literature on mobilizations against resource extraction 
that is dedicated to better understanding how political reactions ‘from above’ emerge and 
take shape (Brock & Dunlap, 2018; Dunlap, 2018b, p. 2018; Geenen & Verweijen, 
2017). This literature attempts to understand the actions taken by governments, 
corporations and allied elites to legitimize and actualize their operations. Geenen and 
Verweijen (2017, p. 758) further argue that to understand social mobilizations against 
resource extraction, it is important to study the interplay between political actions and 
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reactions both ‘from above’ and ‘from below’, and to recognize the diversity of these 
reactions.  
With our contribution we wish to respond to calls to further study the interplay 
between political actions ‘from above’ and ‘from below’ in environmental struggles. We 
argue that political actions from above and from below are dialectically interrelated, with 
dynamic and contested interactions between actors within and between scales. By 
theorizing and substantiating empirically shifting spatial configurations in mobilization 
and counter-mobilizations we aim to contribute to advancing theoretical debates on the 
spatialities of politics in environmental struggles.  
We hold that spatialities (e.g. place, scale, networks, positionality, and mobility) 
are active, dynamic, and composed of social relations (Leitner & Sheppard, 2018; 
Leitner, Sheppard, & Sziarto, 2008; Massey, 2005). Additionally, in theorizing 
spatialities, we have to examine the co-implication of particular spatialities in particular 
contexts. Leitner et al. (2008), drawing inspiration from Massey’s relational space 
(Massey, 2005), argue that it is not simply a question of the co-presence of the relevant 
spatialities, but also how they shape one another and, thereby, the trajectories of 
contentious politics. Finally, we see spatialities as processual; always in the making, 
never finished and never closed (Massey, 1999, pp. 2–3). Understanding spatialities as 
relational, multivalent and co-implicated enables us to reconnect the spatial with the 
political and confront structurally embedded power relations (Merriman et al., 2012).  
This article examines how shifting sociospatial relations come about and how 
shifting spatialities shape – and are reshaped by – the dialectics between political actions 
from above and from below. The spatialities of politics are often conceptualised through 
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the lens of the politics of scale (Leitner et al., 2008; MacKinnon, 2011). Scale is 
conceptualised as a relational, power-laden and contested construction that actors 
strategically engage with, in order to legitimise or challenge existing power relations. In 
the course of these struggles new scales are constructed, and the relative importance of 
different scales is reconfigured. This process is highly contested, involving numerous 
negotiations and struggles between different actors as they attempt to reshape the scalar 
spatiality of power and authority (Leitner, 1997; Leitner et al., 2008).  
Our study aims to contribute to these theoretical debates by examining the 
dialectic of political actions ‘from above’ and ‘from below’ in environmental struggles in 
Guatemala. We do so by analysing the complex configurations of corporate-government-
elite-military networks, and how these networks operate. We also look at the interplay 
between corporate/state mobilization on the one hand, and grassroots mobilization on the 
other, analysing how they mutually shape each other. We argue that these reactions must 
be interpreted against the backdrop of competition and alliances between different elite 
groups that pursue projects of power and authority, which require control over political- 
and security forces. Furthermore, these reactions must be understood in the context of a 
post-war state that has failed to establish hegemony in the Gramscian sense. 
In post-war Guatemala, political and business interests are entangled in ways that 
engender conflict and violence, for example, through linkages between private security 
actors and the economic elite, and between ex-military and private security actors, or 
some combination thereof. These shifting sociospatial relations build on the legacies of 
the civil war, the context in which the peace process developed and the failure to enact 
structural transformations after the signing of the Peace Accords. Social movements and 
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local actors also gained new knowledge, accessed transnational networks and 
strengthened their organization as a result of the peace negotiations and the Peace 
Accords (Aguilar-Støen & Bull, 2017).  
Thus, we argue that extractive conflicts are part of emergent forms of scalar 
politics where different actors struggle to (re)consolidate power and authority in the 
hands of competing groups. These processes intersect with the strategies of grassroots 
movements engaged in multi-scalar strategies by drawing on transnational alliances in a 
struggle where conflicting global discourses are developed and deployed in contested 
ways. Spatialities shape the conditions of possibility for political action. They matter for 
the imaginaries, material practices and emergent trajectories of environmental struggles. 
By examining the shifting spatialities of political actions we are able to reveal the 
articulations of emergent power relations and make visible some of the power geometries 
in environmental struggles.  
2. Conceptualising counterinsurgency in contemporary Guatemala  
The counterinsurgency campaigns in Guatemala were carefully crafted, detailed 
in handbooks and taught in special courses, for example at the School of the Americas. 
Such campaigns materialised in the form of massacres, terror, sexual violence, selective 
assassinations, and kidnappings; as well as in the form of campaigns to gain the “hearts 
and minds” of the population. These campaigns, engineered within the Kennedy 
Administration’s counterinsurgency programme (officially known as military civic 
action, MCA), included food programs, relocations, building of infrastructure, medical 
assistance, literacy programs etc. (Flores, 2017; Gould, 2018; McAllister & Nelson, 
 31 
2013; Schirmer, 1998). To some military experts, the MCA was as important as 
intelligence and operations in the counterinsurgency effort (Gould, 2018).  
Guatemala’s state crafting project was – and in many ways remains - a strategy 
that combines democracy with counterinsurgency. In the words of General Gramajo, 
quoted by Jennifer Schirmer (1998, p. 1); “in Guatemala, a democracy was born out of 
the womb of a counterinsurgency campaign”. Flores (2017) argues that despite the 
official disappearance of the counterinsurgency state, counterinsurgency has become 
common sense among large factions of Guatemalans for whom the lack of empathy 
towards the victims of state violence has been normalized. On the other hand, the 
incapacity and lack of interest on behalf of elite factions to arrive at broad agreements on 
a nation and state building project has shaped a particular form of state in Guatemala 
(Illmer, 2018). This is characterized both by a lack of state hegemony in the Gramscian 
sense, and by the absence of a legitimate monopoly of violence in the Weberian sense, 
which becomes further compounded by disaccord about what counts as legitimate 
violence. As Gramsci argued, the lack of hegemony by dominating groups in the 
formation of discourses, subjectivities and political blocs, leads to a domination of 
subalterns that is dictatorial and crude (Gramsci & Nowell-Smith, 1972).  
In Guatemala, violence has remained a resource in most political struggles, also 
between elites in their competition for domination and economic gains (Bull, 2014). One 
expression of the failure to establish a monopoly of legitimate violence is the 
instrumental but shifting relationship between the economic elite and the military. During 
the civil war, the economic elite collaborated with the military, particularly during the 
government of Ríos Montt. The economic elite provided funds and political support to 
 32 
the former dictator, members of the elite occupied positions in his government, and the 
elite embarked on an international lobby campaign to improve the image of the dictator 
and of Guatemala (Rodríguez-Pellecer, 2013). However, the fact that the military 
controlled much of the state, held high positions in various state enterprises, and acquired 
economic benefits from such positions, increased tension among dominating sectors 
within the economic elite, who in the 1990s were advocating a minimalist state (Bull, 
2005). 
There was also discord within the military between those known as “the 
institutionalists”, who supported the peace process, and the “Officers of the Mountain” 
who suggested that they had won the war on the battlefield4. This latter view was shared 
with the ultraconservative landowner elite (Schirmer, 1998, pp. 210–211). The 
institutionalists advocated “politics as a continuation of war,” where war was continued 
under civilian rule in such a way that the army was not held accountable for war crimes 
(Schirmer, 1998). Schirmer (p. 234) also points out that what the extreme right-wing 
factions within the military and among the ultraconservative landowner elite failed to 
understand was that this ‘strategic combination’ is, over the long run, far more efficient 
and sophisticated in its maintenance of control than cycles of full-scale violence. 
However, as McAllister and Nelson (2013) argue, power is polyvalent; alliances can be 
disrupted and turned to other agendas, and the political entails the possibility of reversals 
and changes. Even “politics as a continuation of war” do not imply a simple or smooth 
execution of strategy. It is within the idea that power is polyvalent that one can make 
                                                
4 For an comprehensive discussion on the Officers of the Mountain see Schirmer (1998), chapter 
9. 
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sense and understand the dialectical and dynamic relationship between strategies from 
“above” and from “below” and the outcomes of this relationship.  
Jenny Pearce (2018, pp. 5–6) puts forth the notion of a “fragmented security 
state” to explain the kind of state emerging in Latin America in the context of 
globalisation, which is favoured by the elites, seeking to promote and protect their own 
interests. The outcome of this state is the reproduction of violence in society and 
particularly amongst the poorest segments of the population. The permeability of this 
state is what matters to elites. Influence trafficking is imperative to securing this 
permeability but comes at the cost of independent and autonomous legal systems. For 
example, as the case of Guatemala exemplifies, such states have judicial systems that 
privilege the protection of private property rights and business transactions over criminal 
law and civil rights. In such a state project, violence remains not only part of the state’s 
policy repertoire but is also unbound by legality. Violence, then, is de facto, an everyday 
tool of political, social and economic interactions. It is used selectively with impunity by 
state security forces, some of which ally or make deals with traditional and emerging 
elites. The entanglements of bureaucratic and political actors with these elites secure the 
legitimization of this de facto governance model. 
Through a series of economic reforms, including trade liberalization, privatization 
of state enterprises and decentralization, a particular form of state formally aiming to 
strengthen the general conditions for business - although often privileging a few - 
consolidated the privileged position of private business in the economy towards the end 
of the war. The ink in the Peace Accords had not yet dried when the government started 
to negotiate the framework for the implementation of a new set of policies that enabled a 
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new wave of investments in the primary sector. The domestic private sector 
enthusiastically embraced these negotiations and there were several local initiatives 
promoting the discourse of economic liberalization and a minimal state (Bull, 2005). 
Furthermore, the new policies highlighted the participation of the private sector, 
including in natural resource-based sectors such as agro-industry, hydropower, oil and 
minerals. The model was also based on close collaboration with private business, both 
domestic and transnational, in the formulation of laws, the selection of priorities in 
regards to public policy, and regulatory frameworks (Dougherty, 2011).  
The mechanisms used to secure the expansion of the extractive industries were 
already in place before the end of the war (Aguilar-Støen, 2016; Solano, 2013). 
Contemporary extractive conflicts highlight that the inroads for new investments at the 
end of the war were accompanied by a complex- albeit more subtle- form of violence, 
which emerged in a historical context that makes it in our analysis impossible to simply 
ignore the war.  
3. The post-war context 
This section discusses the most salient features of the Guatemalan post-war 
context, which are defined by the strengthening of civil society, changing elite dynamics 
and elite competition, as well as shifting opportunity structures following the 
demobilisation of the military.  
3.1. The strengthening of civil society   
The peace process resulted in the opening of certain political spaces to subaltern 
actors and the development of legal instruments that sought to strengthen popular 
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participation in decision-making related to development. As a result, resistance 
movements have turned to these legal frameworks to claim their right to participation. 
Prominent actors, including International Financial Institutions and the modernizing 
sector of the elite promoted neoliberal reforms jointly with the promotion of liberal 
political institutions, and emphasized the importance of participation by civil society 
(Bull & Aguilar-Støen, 2019; Rettberg, 2007). Within this context several grassroots 
organizations, including indigenous ones, successfully allied with national and 
transnational NGOs to gain recognition of their collective rights. One of the results of 
their joint work was the ratification of the International Labour Organization’s 
Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (No. 169) by the government of 
Guatemala in 1996. This convention has also been used as a framework for legitimate 
consultation claims regarding extractive projects. 
Political changes that formally opened spaces for civil society groups were not the 
only factors that increased civil society participation and influence. People living in exile 
or in refugee camps during the war gained considerable organizational experience prior to 
the signing of the Peace Accords. Women and indigenous peoples overcame 
marginalized roles and gained experience in negotiation and project development. After 
the signing of the Peace Accords, these actors found new, albeit limited, political spaces 
in which they could make their voices heard (Brett, 2016). This would eventually set the 
stage on which indigenous and other rural peoples could claim better participation in 
decision-making regarding mining, oil and hydropower.  
The Peace Accords opened a path through which some historically rooted 
socioeconomic injustices could be addressed. However, the required constitutional 
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reforms never materialized. A national referendum in 1999 rejected the Constitutional 
changes required to implement political and economic reforms needed to change or 
eliminate the structural origins of social conflict in Guatemala, such as inequality, land 
concentration, lack of institutions for the redistribution of income, and racism (McAllister 
& Nelson, 2013).  The signing of the Peace Accords resulted in a transformation of the 
ways in which direct violence manifests itself in the country. However, the inherent 
structural violence embedded in the organization of Guatemalan society remains 
unchanged (Aguilar-Støen & Bull, 2017). Changes related to the role of the army in post-
war Guatemala, although implemented to some extent, did not dismantle the power of the 
army within the government. As we will discuss below, this failure is partly a result of 
the increasing competition between elites in Guatemala. Popular claims and demands 
related to extractive industries show that, despite the signing of the Peace Accords, the 
aspirations and demands of subaltern groups have not been included in the post-war 
social, political and economic reorganization of the state.  
A series of new national and international legal instruments that sought to 
strengthen popular participation in decision-making processes also came into being and 
required new forms of responses from above. The UN-International Labour 
Organization’s (ILO) Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (No. 169, 
1989), as well as on the country’s Municipal Code, Decree 12-2002, and the Law of 
Local Development Councils all secure rights to participation in decision making and 
Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) of indigenous peoples, and in certain cases, of 
local non-indigenous communities. Groups opposing extractive projects increasingly 
mobilize rights-based discourses, legal mechanisms and strategic litigation. In recent 
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years, strategic litigation has disrupted extractive projects and Guatemalan courts have 
suspended and cancelled the operating licences of several projects due to the failure to 
properly consult with affected indigenous populations. From our interviews with lawyers 
it became evident that just in the last six years more than 25 cases have been brought on 
behalf of indigenous groups against the State of Guatemala for granting mining and 
hydropower licenses without complying with the right to (FPIC).  
3.2. Shifting elite dynamics in the post-war era  
The combination of political changes related to post-war democratization and 
economic changes starting in the 1980s led to the emergence of new elites and new 
factions within the traditional elite. The economic elite adapted to global economic 
changes by forming alliances with transnational corporations and by expanding 
regionally and globally (Bull, Castellacci, & Kasahara, 2014). Additionally, new groups 
controlling important resources in the country started to challenge the economic 
dominance of the old landed elite, including in the media sector and telecommunications 
(Bull, 2005; Solano, 2015a). In the extractive industries, there are also new international 
actors, for instance, Canadian, Russian and U.S. mining firms, European firms in 
hydropower development and Nicaraguan groups in sugarcane production. Finally, 
former military officers who enriched themselves through illegal activities during the war 
now fight for the control of political parties, and largely control private security firms 
(Argueta, 2012).  
There are also various ways in which domestic elites collaborate in new ways 
with transnational companies. This includes domestic economic groups participating as 
minor partners in specific projects. Domestic companies function as service providers for 
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transnational companies, for instance, electricity, infrastructure and equipment. They also 
function as political “door openers” for transnational companies. Even though mining is 
of minor economic importance to Guatemala’s economy, to control activities associated 
to mining may be of great importance for the domestic elite, not only in economic terms 
but to maintain their influence within competing power networks (Aguilar-Støen & Bull, 
2016).  
The fall of former president Pérez Molina and former vice-president Baldetti in 2015 
due to the discovery of a corruption ring in the toll office, known as “La línea,” shows 
that control of the state apparatus is no longer exclusive to the economic elite. The 
military, particularly war officers, had disputed control over the toll office since before 
the signing of the Peace Accords (Estrada & Rodriguez, 2015; Peacock & Beltrán, 2003). 
Changing elite dynamics also led to new ways to control the state through campaign 
financing, as revealed by the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala 
(CICIG, for its acronym in Spanish). While in the past the economic elite was the main 
financer of electoral campaigns, currently the economic elite contributes 25% of the 
funding, 50% comes from companies providing services to the state, and the remaining 
25% comes from illicit structures, mainly drug trafficking (CICIG, 2015). 
Both the legislative and executive branches are increasingly sites of competition 
between old and new elites. As shown by Briscoe and Rodríguez-Pellecer (2010) the 
Legislative Assembly can be compared to a market place where political favours are 
bought and sold, open to the influences of groups associated with licit as well as illicit 
sectors. Despite this, the traditional elite continues to hold strong influence in the 
legislative and executive branches of the state. Naveda (2011) suggests that the most 
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powerful Guatemalan elite (family) corporations contributed to funding the political 
campaigns of former presidents Arzú, Berger and Pérez Molina. Once their candidate is 
in office, members of these groups take positions in the government (Valdez, 2003). 
Ideological affinity is not a requisite for the elite to offer economic support to the 
candidates. Rather, they pursue a strategy of supporting whoever has better odds of 
winning so as to secure their economic interests and to establish new business 
opportunities that further strengthen their position. This happens, for example, through 
their influence on the drafting of favourable laws (notably for our case, the mining bill 
and the electric energy bill) (Aguilar-Støen, 2015; Aguilar-Støen & Hirsch, 2017; 
Dougherty, 2011).  
3.3. The demobilization of the military, shifting opportunity structures and 
emerging private security assemblages  
In addition to competition between old and new elites, the demobilization of the 
military also led to various power struggles and shifting opportunity structures resulting 
in novel, emerging private security assemblages. Military personnel entered into illegal 
activities during the civil war (smuggling, tax evasion, drug trafficking) through diffuse 
and shifting networks by way of which they amassed considerable fortunes (Gagne, 
2016; Peacock & Beltrán, 2003). As a result of the volatility of such networks and the 
illegal nature of their activities, it was crucial to secure access to and control of the 
intelligence offices of the government. A key resource was the Estado Mayor 
Presidencial (EMP). Several corruption cases revealed that struggles to control the EMP 
were also related to the fight for political power and authority. The goal of controlling 
intelligence offices seems to be related to the opportunities it provided for monitoring and 
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maintaining surveillance of the activities of competing illegal networks5. The dissolution 
of the EMP in 2003 did not mean that the military completely lost access to intelligence 
offices. Indeed, some of them entered newly created civilian intelligence offices while 
others joined the private sector, and organised crime, drug trafficking and other legal and 
illegal activities (Argueta, 2012). 
The private security sector absorbed a considerable number of former military 
personnel in a process that intensified after 1996 (Argueta, 2012). Additionally, 
international security advisors, particularly from the USA and Israel, who advised the 
military on issues related to military intelligence during the civil war, started to provide 
security services to the private sector in Guatemala. This proved profitable and they 
eventually established their own private security firms in alliance with Israeli and British 
companies (Argueta, 2012; Solano, 2015b, 2015c). Some of these transnational security 
companies, Golan, Yantarni, Centurion Security and several domestic companies like 
Grupo Escorpión S.A., provide security and intelligence services to mining and oil 
companies. The manager of Grupo Escorpión S.A.- a company involved in a corruption 
case as revealed by CICIG in 2015 - is a former military serviceman with links to Grupo 
Golan (Solano, 2015a).  
Abrahamsen and Williams (2009) have theorized the processes described here as 
“global security assemblages.” By situating security privatization within broader 
                                                
5 Various former military members who worked at the EMP are accused in the aforementioned 
corruption cases, are also accused or convicted in cases related to crimes committed during the 
civil war; or both. For example: Manuel Antonio Callejas y Callejas (Caso Moreno, Caso Molina 
Thyssen, drug trafficking); former general Luis Francisco Ortega Menaldo (Caso Moreno); Otto 
Pérez-Molina (Caso la línea, caso cooptación del estado); Juan Guillermo Oliva Carrera (Caso 
Moreno; Caso Mirna Mack). 
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transformations in the relationship between public and private power and authority, 
Abrahamsen and Williams analyse the emergence of global security assemblages; 
settings where a range of different global and local, public and private security agents 
interact, cooperate and compete to produce new institutions, practices, and forms of 
security governance (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2009, p. 3). These changes indicate 
important developments in the relationship between security and the state, structures of 
political power and authority, and the operations of global capital. In the next section we 
turn our attention to how these development shape and are shaped by tactics and 
strategies of resistance from grassroots organizations. 
4. Resistance ‘from below’ and changing spatialities of contentious politics  
Emerging political reactions to extractive projects address a range of interrelated 
concerns, including discontent over unfair distribution of environmental risk stemming 
from projects and threats to land-based livelihoods. Contention also stems from the 
perceived asymmetry between profits earned by corporations and low gains for the 
government and host-communities, deriving from non-inclusive legislative processes 
characterized by strong favouritism towards industry, as our interviews reveal. 
Opposition is also related to failure of governments to comply with and respect the rights 
of indigenous peoples and their political autonomy. More broadly, movements question 
ideas and visions of development that they feel dispossess and exclude them and express 
discontent over the unequal distribution of socio-environmental benefits and burdens 
from extractive projects (Cf. Hall et al., 2015).  
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For the purpose of this paper, we focus on political reactions ‘from below’ as they 
relate to opposition to the mining industry (Hall et al., 2015). There are four major 
mining conflicts across Guatemala that are important to our analysis: The Marlin mine in 
San Marcos, the Fenix mine in Izabal, the El Tambor mine in Guatemala, and the Escobal 
mine in Santa Rosa6. Table 1. summarises the main features of the conflicts we included 
in our analysis. The oldest project (Fenix) dates back to the beginning of the civil war 
while the extraction licence of the most recent one (El Escobal) was approved in 2013. A 
Russian company owns one mining project (Fenix) while North American companies 
(Canada and USA) own the rest. The Marlin mine operated from 2005 to 2017 and was 
Guatemala’s first large-scale gold mine. The mine is now closed and is currently 
undergoing a reclamation process. Recently the Guatemalan Supreme and the 
Constitutional Court suspended mining activities in the cases of the Tambor and the 
Escobal projects for failing to consult affected communities prior to the installation of the 
projects.  
We observe several common tactics and strategies used by social movements 
resisting mining projects. These include organizing community referendums, staging 
demonstrations and the use of roadblocks. Social movements participate in transnational 
activist networks and collaborate with international NGOs and religious groups (Della 
Porta & Tarrow, 2005). From our interviews and analysis of resistance campaigns it 
became clear that activists increasingly engage in legal action framed as an attempt to 
                                                
6 There are also other ongoing conflicts that share similarities with the ones we analyze here but 
that were not included in our study, for example, the Cerro Blanco gold mining project owned by 
Bluestone Resources and the San Gabriel cement project owned by Guatemalan Cementos 
Progreso. 
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legitimize their right to participate in environmental decision-making. Legal action is also 
a strategy used to halt, slow down or cancel projects. Legal action, if well-advertised and 
in the cases where shareholders care, can also harm corporate and government reputation, 
hurting profitability, and as such is a formidable method for exerting pressure on 
corporations and governments. 
These practices form part of a larger process of using multi-scalar strategies by 
shifting scales of collective action and politics of networking7. There are three important 
processes within the changing scales of anti-mining resistance in Guatemala: diffusion of 
collective action, externalization of claims, and transnational coalition forming. Diffusion 
is the spread of ideas, practices, and frames from one site to another. Externalization is 
the vertical projection or ‘stretching’ of place-based claims onto institutions or actors in 
different places. Transnational coalition forming is the formation of dynamic trans-local 
networks among actors from different sites with similar claims (Della Porta & Tarrow, 
2005; Tarrow, 2005). Through processes of shifting scales of collective reaction, actors, 
organizations, and social movements that oppose extractive projects try to both ‘undo’ 
and ‘fix’ certain ‘scales’ that are the material expressions of power relations, and they do 
so in order to rescale and dislodge corporate-government-military geometries of power 
(González, 2006; MacKinnon, 2011).  
Community mining consultations are an example of place-based action 
shifting/stretching scales to produce coordinated transnational action. Walter and Urkidi 
(2017, p. 265) argue that community consultations are being institutionalized in the 
                                                
7 Sidney Tarrow, Doug McAdam and Charles Tilly have written in detail about scale shift in 
transnational contention, which simply put, is the spread of collective action beyond its typically 
localized origins (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001; Tarrow, 2005; Tarrow & McAdam, 2005). 
 44 
context of mining conflicts in Latin America. Consultations are not isolated experiences 
but constitute a strategy diffused and transformed in the midst of multi-scalar learning 
processes where social movements exchange strategies, experiences and discourses. This 
is certainly the case in Guatemala, where the diffusion of practices takes place both intra-
nationally and internationally. The first community referendum on mining in Guatemala 
took place in 2005 when the people of Sipakapa voted overwhelmingly against the 
Marlin mine in San Marcos. The referendum became a milestone in the history of 
contemporary anti-mining movements in Guatemala (Urkidi, 2011; Yagenova & Garcia, 
2009). In the years following the Sipakapa referendum there has been a wave of 
consultations in Guatemala and the community referendum has become one of the most 
important resources used by social movements in their struggle against extractive 
projects.  
Guatemalan activists also increasingly engage in legal action in attempts to 
legitimize their claims and to stop projects. Legal action offers strategic resources to 
social movements who often otherwise lack the ability to alter corporate practices. The 
threat of litigation may be one of the few sources of regulatory power available in the 
neoliberal world order that can radically transform the playing field in which corporations 
and their critics interact (Kirsch, 2014). Through judicial processes, Guatemalan social 
movements stake their claims internationally, producing new scales of resistance and 
environmental struggles. Domestic courts in industrialized countries are increasingly 
willing to hear cases filed against companies that operate in foreign countries. In 2014, 
the Norwegian Pension Fund divested from a Canadian mining company, Tahoe 
Resources, for grave violations of the human rights of Guatemalan indigenous and 
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environmental activists8. One of those cases was brought to Canadian courts. Two 
Canadian mining companies are currently being held accountable on their home turf for 
violations they are accused of have committed in Guatemala. In 2017, a shareholder class 
action was filed in the United States against a Canadian mining company operating in 
Guatemala for failure to properly inform shareholders about local opposition against the 
mining project (Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, 2017; Quan, 2017). 
Anti-extractive resistance in Guatemala has taken on the shape of a web of 
networked groups that bridge claims and identities (i.e. indigenous and peasant), 
highlighting the many ways in which environmental concerns intersect with demands for 
social and economic justice (Martínez-Alier, 2002). Indigenous authorities, the rural 
poor, the Catholic Church, as well as national and international networks of activists 
share knowledge and experiences, which shape the dynamics of anti-extractive resistance 
in Guatemala and as such political actions ‘from below’. This proliferation of new forms 
of multi-scalar resistance stretches across boundaries of scale, reproduces new scales, and 
restructures existing scales of resistance and environmental struggles. By deploying 
scalar strategies, social movements make their voices heard to expand and secure their 
political and geographical power (Jones, Leitner, Marston, & Sheppard, 2017). 
5. The dialectics between responses ‘from above’ and ‘from below’  
Here we analyse the imaginaries and discursive practices mobilized by corporate-
government networks in response to social mobilization ‘from below,’ and the ways in 
which responses from ‘above’ and ‘below’ mutually shape each other. Scale frames are 
                                                
8 https://etikkradet.no/files/2017/02/Tilrådning_Tahoe-Resources_8-4-2014.pdf 
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developed and deployed to locate problems and causes at particular scales in order to 
delegitimize opposition, particularly with reference to national security and discourses on 
terrorism under the influence of the “war on terror” or the “war on drugs” (Kurtz, 2003; 
Martin & Miller, 2003). 
5.1. The changing dynamics of violence and repression  
In Guatemala, corporate and state actors have historically mobilized violence and 
repression in attempts to manage dissent and maintain control. During the civil war 
reactions to mining opposition were decisively violent. At the height of the war in the 
1970s and early 1980s numerous human rights abuses were committed by the military at 
Fenix nickel mine9 in the El Estor region10 (Nolin & Stephens, 2010; Solano, 2015b). 
Violence and repression, including assassinations, assaults, forced evictions, rape, and 
criminalization of dissent remain a common response to contemporary mining 
opposition. However, whereas during the civil war the main perpetrators were public 
security forces, currently, public security forces operate in tandem with private security 
firms. The various types of links and networks that international mining companies 
                                                
9 The Fenix nickel mine in El Estor was the first transnational metal mining project in Guatemala. 
For a detailed discussion of the history of the Fenix Project and INCO see Fox (2015). 
 
 
10 To this day, the Fenix project continues to be plagued with accounts of human rights violations 
and violent evictions. Hudbay Minerals Inc., which owned and operated the mine from 2004 until 
2011, remains caught up in a lawsuit regarding the killing of Adolfo Ich (killed by private 
security forces employed at the Fenix project), a lawsuit regarding the shooting of German Chub 
Choc (German was shot at close range in an unprovoked attack by the head of security personnel 
for Hudbay’s Fenix project), and a lawsuit regarding the rapes of 11 Mayan Q’eqchi’ women (the 
women were raped by uniformed mining company security personnel, police and military during 
the forceful expulsion of Mayan Q’eqchi’ families from their farms and homes in the remote 
community of Lote Ocho) (Klippensteins, Barristers & Solicitors, 2018). 
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establish with Guatemala’s domestic elite also include contact with private security firms, 
which often have ties to international security firms. 
Local grassroots movements, for their part, have responded to violence in a 
variety of ways. In the Escobal case, because many of the indigenous people from 
Eastern Guatemala of a certain age have a military background, and many of the younger 
ones also attended the military academy11, their resistance mobilizations included 
counterinsurgency intelligence tactics to organize and protect themselves. These tactics 
shape how they organize their blockades, communicate and coordinate their movements.  
In Guatemala, violence remains a resource in most political struggles and 
certainly in ‘engineering extraction.’ However, there have been shifts and rescaling in the 
spatialities of violence, from the public security forces holding a legitimate monopoly of 
violence (albeit a weak one) to new private security assemblages. These assemblages 
emerged, as we have discussed above, in the aftermath of the civil war and in the context 
of the changing dynamics of intra-elite conflicts and competition.  
5.2. The enduring “internal enemy”  
One of the most salient resources employed by the Guatemalan elite when its 
interests are threatened is to conjure up the image of the internal enemy by demonizing 
its opponents as ‘communists’ or ‘terrorists’.  This is by no means a new strategy. In 
order to protect its interests, the extreme right-wing landowner elite and the private sector 
have traditionally cultivated and depended upon visceral reactions to the guerrilla and to 
                                                
11 For the indigenous population of Eastern Guatemala since the beginning of the 20th century the 
army has been a common vehicle for social mobility. A special army task force during the civil 
war was called “Jalapa Battalion” and it was composed mostly of Xinka indigenous from 
Jalapa/Xalapán.  
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‘communism’ among the military and certain segments of Guatemalan society (Schirmer, 
1998). In the contemporary context, and as a response to the growing mobilization 
against extractive industries, the government and the economic elite have revived the 
notion of the internal enemy. This strategy unifies otherwise divided elites and justifies 
the use of violence against dissidents who threaten ‘national stability’ and economic 
growth, further entrenching elite power, which now also includes military elites.  
Ibarra (2006, p. 195) argues that the decade between 1944 and 1954 created a 
space for collective subjects’ political participation in a way that was unacceptable for the 
business sector, the ecclesiastic hierarchy and the extreme right wing. The figure of the 
internal enemy was conceived and could be applied to members of the communist party, 
opposition politicians, catholic priests, union leaders, students, intellectuals, and rural 
activists (Oglesby & Ross, 2009). Its purpose was to legitimize violence and eventually 
genocide against the indigenous population during the civil war (Ibarra, 2006). 
Nowadays, the figure of the internal enemy assumes primarily three forms: 1) 
communists, 2) terrorists, and 3) intersections with racist discourses.  
Our analysis of the media indicates that anti-communist and anti-terrorist rhetoric 
are also intertwined with racist discourses against the indigenous peoples of Guatemala. 
The media is often used to appeal to the widespread racism in mestizo and white 
Guatemalans, blaming the indigenous movement for wanting to impose ways of 
governing that would divide society in indigenous (with more privileges) and non-
indigenous (with fewer rights). 
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In the early 2000s groups like Liga Pro-Patria,12 the Foundation against Terrorism, 
and the military veterans’ association (AVEMILGUA) started to portray those fighting 
for transitional justice as communists and enemies of the state (Molden, 2016). Then as 
the first protests against mining emerged in the early 2000s13, a similar rhetoric was used 
against protestors.  
It was after the 2001 terrorist attacks in New York that the rhetoric of the military 
veterans and their sympathisers increasingly started to use the term “terrorist” 
interchangeably with “communist”. ‘Terrorist’ was of course a term also used during the 
cold war, but its popularity as the new stereotype of the “other” that threatens national 
security increased only recently in Guatemala. In 2005, the penal code was amended to 
include the legal figure of “terrorist,” which allowed FCT, Liga Pro-Patria and the Public 
Prosecutor’s Office to charge human rights activists who oppose extractive projects with 
terrorism. The Public Prosecutor’s office (Ministerio Público) charged activists who 
protested against mining in Santa Rosa on terrorism charges in 2013. Following the 2014 
massacre in the town of ”Los Pajoques,” the company described the activism of those 
who oppose the San Gabriel mining project as acts of terrorism. 
5.3. Corporate-government counterinsurgency   
The corporate-government nexus also engages in ‘corporate counterinsurgency’ 
tactics in response to extractive opposition (Cf. Brock and Dunlap, 2018). Opposition 
                                                
12 Liga Pro-Patria was formed by Francisco Bianchi, pastor of the evangelical church Verbo, the 
same church to which Ríos Montt belonged (Handy, 2003). 
  
13 The conflict associated with the Marlin mine that broke out in 2004 marks perhaps the 




against the extractive industries has been elevated to an issue of national security. The 
counterinsurgency discourse became embedded in formal policy when, in March 2013, 
the National Security Council of Guatemala (NSC)14 decided that social conflicts related 
to extractive projects should be approached from the perspective of national security. The 
NSC then created the Inter-institutional Commission for Integral Development” (ICID)15, 
which is led by a retired colonel from the Ministry of Interior, and whose role is to collect 
intelligence, produce socio-political maps, identify issues related to royalties and conduct 
analysis of communities and social movements (Hernández, 2014; Solano, 2015c). In the 
framing of conflicts as issues of national security there are remnants of the counter-
insurgency strategy of the past when national security was a frequent trope used by the 
counter-insurgency state. 
This trope contributes now, like then, to manufacturing consent within a segment 
of the Guatemalan population for the use of repression and violence against protestors. 
This is connected to the government’s frequent evocation of the supposedly on-going 
fight against drug trafficking. The link to anti-drugs policy became evident in our 
analysis of public discourses by the government as in each of the cases where states of 
                                                
14 The national security council is an inter-ministerial council that coordinates the National 
Security System and is in charge of policy making related to security and advising the president 
on security matters. The council is composed of the president and vice-president, the minister of 
Foreign Affairs, the minister of Interior, the minister of Defense, the secretary of Strategic 
Intelligence of the State and the Attorney General of the Nation 
http://www.mindef.mil.gt/leyes_reglamentos/leyes_y_reglamentos/ley_marco_d018-2008.pdf 
 
   
15 The ICID includes representatives from the Ministry of Energy and Mines; Ministry of the 
Environment and Natural Resources; the Ministry of the Interior; the National Council of 
Protected Areas; the National Security Council; Secretary for Strategic State Intelligence; the 
Attorney General’s office; the Permanent Dialogue Commission; departmental governors and 
municipal mayors. 
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siege were declared since 2012, the government justified it as a means to combat drug 
trafficking (Cf. Paley, 2014). Also, our fieldwork revealed that drug trafficking charges 
have been brought against leaders of the anti-mining resistance movements in an attempt 
to undermine their activism. These narratives of civil resistance as leftist plot, and/or as 
threats to national security, serve to delegitimize resistance to extractive projects and to 
justify its repression.  
5.4. Lawfare and soft strategies for engineering extraction 
In reaction to the different strategies of anti-extractive resistance, such as strategic 
grassroots driven litigation and the wave of community referendums on extractive 
projects, a number of ‘soft’ strategies from above have emerged. These ‘soft’ techniques 
aim to render conflict manageable rather than to outright eradicate oppositional groups 
(Dunlap, 2018a). For example, mining companies establish their own community 
relations’ offices and sustainable community development programs. These mechanisms 
involve quasi-development programs that may involve health services, technical 
capacitation, agricultural extension, infrastructure construction and even political training 
of community leaders. We also observe an increasing culture of legalism where 
corporations and grassroots movements conduct their struggles through “lawfare” – “the 
resort to legal instruments…to commit acts of political coercion” (Comaroff & Comaroff, 
2006, p. 30). 
In response to this increasing culture of legality, the private sector and the 
government have taken several seemingly contradictory measures. One prominent 
strategy has been to try to undermine claims for participation and delegitimize 
mechanisms like the community referendums. In such instances, the private sector has 
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raised strong concerns about the ‘lack of legal certainty’, arguing that the ILO 169 is not 
being applied correctly and that it weakens national sovereignty. In July 2017, the 
umbrella organization of the private sector – CACIF - petitioned the ILO to intervene in 
Guatemala, claiming that the Convention was being violated and manipulated. CACIF 
claims that recent unfavourable court rulings undermine legal certainty in the country and 
infringe on the right to freedom of enterprise and work, generating social conflict 
(Bolaños & Gramajo, 2017).  
Another reaction to the community referendums has been to deny the existence of 
indigenous peoples in areas affected by extractive projects in an attempt to negate the 
need for prior consultation as prescribed by the ILO Convention. In the case of the 
Escobal mine, following the 2017 court rulings which temporarily suspended the mine’s 
licenses because prior consultation requirements had not been met, the private sector 
along with several government institutions made statements denying the existence of the 
Xinka people, either outright or in the vicinity of the mine. The then president of CACIF 
was quoted saying that the Supreme Court’s resolution was based on a “non-existent 
community” [referring to the Xinka people] and that as such the court’s resolution was 
false (Prensa Libre, 2017). The minister of Energy and Mines supported the private 
sector’s perspective, saying that prior to the authorization of the license in 2013 the state 
had determined that there are no Xinka in San Rafael Las Flores (Prensa Libre, 2017). 
Leifsen et al. (2017) suggest that local groups and their allies´ involvement in processes 
like claiming FPIC can have unexpected outcomes. After the rulings of the court, we 
have observed in one of our study sites the revitalization of a more politicized Xinka 
indigenous identity in the area around the mining project. When a new national census 
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was scheduled for 2017, the Xinka parliament launched an information campaign aimed 
at increasing the visibility of people who self-identify as Xinka. If successful, a higher 
number of indigenous Xinka will be registered in national statistics and the obligation to 
consult indigenous people would be strengthened.  
Our findings suggest that strategic litigation and the mobilization of discourses of 
FPIC engages both grassroots organizations and private companies. Both types of actors 
rescale their actions and seek support and chances to exert influence on local processes 
by appealing to international treaties (ILO) and lobbying in international arenas. Our 
empirical findings seem to contradict Dunlap’s (2018a) conceptualization of FPIC as 
“soft” counterinsurgency to manage conflict insofar as in Guatemala the processes and 
the claims were launched and sustained by grassroots organizations, and it is only 
recently that the government and the private sector are trying to co-opt and control FPIC. 
However, we acknowledge that the law is a double-edged sword where it may strengthen 
the claims of anti-extractive movements while also enabling new forms of dispossession. 
But these processes are still playing out in Guatemala and the last word has yet to be said. 
6. Conclusion  
In this paper we examined the interplay between political actions ‘from above’ 
and ‘from below’ in extractive conflicts in Guatemala. We analysed how changing 
sociospatial relations come about and how shifting spatialities shape – and are reshaped 
by – political actions from above and form below. We argue that political actions from 
above and from below are dialectically interrelated, shaped by dynamic and contested 
interactions between actors within and between scales. Finally, we argue that extractive 
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conflicts are part of emergent forms of scalar politics where different actors struggle to 
(re)consolidate power and authority in the hands of competing groups. These shifting 
spatial configurations intersect with the strategies of grassroots movements, which 
engage in their own scalar strategies, and which are embedded within networked scalar 
configurations that extend from local to global relations (Swyngedouw & Heynen, 2003).  
The inception of extractive projects in Guatemala has been accompanied by 
extraordinary violence. This suggests that in the post-war context the state continues to 
fail in implementing a consensus-based strategy of governance, and where different 
actors continue to struggle to consolidate power and authority in the hands of competing 
groups. Our study demonstrates that emerging political and economic context are shaped 
by changing elite dynamics, which in turn continue to sharpen intra- and inter- elite 
competition, fostering new ways of strategic alliances without allowing for the 
consolidation of a single dominant group. As these groups compete and collaborate in 
shifting constellations, they are less interested in neutralizing resistance and dissent via 
concessions and forms of compromise, but instead opt for the explicit exclusion and 
marginalization of oppositional forces by various mechanisms ranging from discursive 
and legal structures to outright violence and repression (Cf. Tansel, 2017). Violence is 
discursively justified by linking opposition to extractive industries to the rhetoric of the 
civil war, by way of which the notion of the internal enemy is used again. This notion 
appeals to the non-indigenous population in such a way that the use of force and violence 
becomes grounded in popular consent. The excessive use of violence and the lack of 
consensus of what constitutes legitimate violence are also expressions of the failure to 
establish state hegemony by dominating groups (Gramsci & Nowell-Smith, 1972) 
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In this paper we discussed a range of discursive and material practices mobilized by 
corporate-government networks in response to social mobilization ‘from below.’ These 
networks frame problems and causes at particular scales in order to delegitimize 
opposition, particularly with reference to national security and discourses on terrorism 
under the influence of the international “war on terror” or “war on drugs.” These 
processes intersect with the strategies of grassroots movements engaging in their own 
multi-scalar strategies by drawing on transnational alliances in a struggle where 
conflicting global discourses are developed and deployed in contested ways.  
The effects of the imageries and practices that are the emergent constellations of 
political actions ‘from above,’ are to a great degree formed by class interest of dominant 
classes and vary based on socio-political markers. In the case of Guatemala, this 
disproportionally affect indigenous groups and individuals, highlighting the continued 
relevance of race in the structuring of the Guatemalan society. However, despite the 
resources at their disposal, and the asymmetrical power relations that define the 
Guatemalan context, elites and their networks do not always succeed in their goals, or at 
least not so easily. It is not only subalterns who respond to elite strategies, grassroots 
movements also create and change conditions, although these changes might be short-
lived, to which the elites respond by creating new scenarios. Indeed, we argue that 
political actions ‘from above’ and ‘from below’ are dialectically interrelated and shaped 
by dynamic and contested interactions between actors within and between scales. This 
dialectical understanding of the relationship between elites and social movements open 
the possibility to demystify the elites and to conceptualize them as social actors that are 
in constant negotiations and often in conflict with each other.   
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 The frequent use of violence that we illustrate in our study also attests to the 
obstacles to a coherent state building project in post-war contexts in which dominant 
social groups do not see the need to build strong institutions or even to agree on what 
legitimate violence is. Opposition to extractive industries in Guatemala has been met with 
violence throughout history. The main differences between the past and the current 
situation, however, are the shifting sociospatial constellations where the state increasingly 
relies on private security assemblages to uphold their coercive functions, often with links 
to former military personnel and transnational security firms. The violent repression of 
popular opposition to extractive industries can be understood as part of a broader political 
project borne by multiple agencies of the state with the participation of the private sector, 
driven by a myriad of interests and aiming at neutralizing oppositional politics - or what 













Chapter four:  From the streets to the courts: Mobilizing the law to subvert 
hegemonic power relations in environmental struggles 
1. Introduction 
In Guatemala, different types of community referendums (e.g. consultas 
comunitarias, autoconsultas, consultas de buena fe, consultas de vecinos etc.) have 
become one of the most common tools for resisting mining and hydropower projects. In 
fact, Guatemala is the country with the most community referendums on extractive 
projects to have taken place in Latin America (Walter & Urkidi, 2017). Through these 
mechanisms, grassroots movements have increasingly been able to assert the rights of 
mining-affected communities and indigenous people to self-determination in 
environmental decision-making and natural resource management, questioning the 
legitimacy of dominant ideas about development and human-environment relations. 
While those involved in resistance against environmental injustices may predominantly 
belong to groups that are vulnerable to marginalization, they are also capable of 
transformative social mobilization (Nielsen & Nilsen, 2015; Rodríguez Garavito & 
Santos, 2005). The participants in these environmental struggles use a wide array of 
strategies and tactics to resist extractive projects. They organize community referendums, 
stage demonstrations and set up roadblocks. They mobilize transnational advocacy 
networks and collaborate with international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
religious groups. Activists also increasingly deploy legal discourses and mechanisms as 
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part of their political and social struggles, using ‘the law’ to expand the political spaces 
available to them for transformative politics (Rajagopal, 2003; Sieder, 2010, 2011)16, 
which is the focus of our paper.    
Our paper focuses on the ways in which anti-mining movements in Guatemala 
mobilize ‘the law’ in attempts to subvert hegemonic power relations in environmental 
struggles. We examine why subaltern actors increasingly turn to the law and legal 
mechanisms, as well as the particular ways in which these actors mobilize the law in their 
struggles. We wish to contribute to ongoing debates on the possibilities and limitations of 
the law in expanding the conditions of possibility for marginalized groups engaged in 
environmental struggles (Nielsen & Nilsen, 2015; Rodríguez Garavito & Santos, 2005; 
Santos, 2002; Sieder, 2011; Walter & Urkidi, 2017)..  
There is an emerging jurisprudence in Guatemala that acknowledges the principle 
of prior consultation, particularly with regard to indigenous rights. In 2015, the 
Guatemalan Constitutional Court ordered the suspension of a hydropower project in 
Nebaj (Vega I and Vega II) for failure to consult affected indigenous communities prior 
to the installation of th project (Price, 2015). In 2017, Oxec I and Oxec II, another 
hydropower project in Alta Verapaz, had its licenses temporarily suspended for the same 
reason but resumed operations after a contested state-led consultation processes was 
carried out (Herrera, 2017). Mining projects have also been suspended, and in 2016, the 
Guatemalan Supreme Court of Justice ordered the definitive suspension of the “El 
                                                
16 In Sveinsdóttir, Aguilar-Støen and Bull (forthcoming) we observe the ways in which, in 
Guatemala, corporations and the state react to contentious environmental politics with - “lawfare” 
– “the resort to legal instruments…to commit acts of political coercion” (Comaroff & Comaroff, 
2006, p. 30) 
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Tambor” mining project for failing to consult affected communities prior to the projects 
installment (Aguilar-Støen & Hirsch, 2017; Pitán, 2016). In July 2017, Guatemala’s 
Constitutional Court suspended the licenses of the country’s now largest mine, the 
Escobal mine in San Rafael Las Flores, again citing inadequate prior consultation of 
affected indigenous communities. In September 2018, the Constitutional Court ordered 
the Ministry of Energy and Mines to carry out consultations in the areas surrounding the 
Escobal mine. This verdict17 is considered a huge victory for environmental and 
indigenous activists in Guatemala and their ongoing struggle against extractive industries 
in the country.  
Environmental activists frame strategic legal action and the mobilization of legal 
discourses as an attempt to legitimize their right to self-determination in natural resource 
management. Legal action is also a strategy used to halt, slow down and cancel extractive 
projects. It offers a strategic resource to communities and grassroots movements that 
otherwise may lack the means to alter corporate practices, at least through formal, 
institutional mechanisms (Kirsch, 2014). Strategic grassroots driven litigation can also 
harm corporate and government reputation, damaging profitability, thus making it a 
formidable tactic for putting pressure on corporations and governments (Sveinsdóttir, 
Aguilar-Støen, & Bull, forthcoming).  
The articulations between different scales of law have become more complex, 
with increasingly porous boundaries between local, national, and global law giving rise to 
                                                
17 Guatemalan Constitutional Court, Expediente 4785-2017; Expediente 4785-2018. Court 




‘legal hybrids’ and new forms of legal meaning and action (Santos, 2002; Sieder, 2017). 
Domestic courts in so-called ‘industrialized countries’ are increasingly willing to hear 
civil claims against companies that operate in foreign ‘host’ countries (Kirsch, 2014). In 
2014, the Norwegian Pension Fund divested from a Canadian mining company for 
serious human rights violations against Guatemalan indigenous and environmental 
activists. One of those cases was brought to Canadian courts. Two Canadian mining 
companies are currently entangled in legal battles on their home turf for violations 
they’re accused of committing in Guatemala. In 2017 a shareholder class action was filed 
in the United States against a Canadian mining company operating in Guatemala for 
failure to adequately inform shareholders about local opposition against the mining 
project (Sveinsdóttir, Aguilar-Støen and Bull, forthcoming).  
In this paper, we examine the growing importance of law, legal institutions and 
legal actors to environmental struggles. In doing so, we wish to get at the complex and 
dynamic interweaving of law, space, politics and power in struggles for environmental 
justice. More specifically, we analyze the ways in which grassroots actors mobilize the 
law in an attempt to subvert hegemonic norms and power relations in environmental 
struggles (Nielsen & Nilsen, 2015; Rodríguez Garavito & Santos, 2005; Sieder, 2007, 
2010, 2011). We argue that due to lack of adequate political spaces to advance 
environmental struggles, activists have turned to the judiciary as a strategy to expand 
their repertoires of contention18. In doing so, they attempt to push open new spaces for 
                                                
18 In social movement therory, a repetoire of contention refers to the different set of means or 
‘claims-making routines’ groups have to make claims . The term is attributed ot Charles Tilly 
(Della Porta, 2013). 
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participation, recognition and distribution in order to access environmental justice (Cf. 
Fraser, 2010; Schlosberg, 2007). 
The emerging legal strategies adopted by environmental activists in Guatemala 
highlight how the many dynamic configurations of environmental struggles are related to 
legal processes in lieu of political spaces. The legal cultures we observe in Guatemalan 
environmental struggles raise important questions about the dialectics of resistance and 
the law, and how these processes shape environmental governance, political participation 
and contestation. Those who engage in resistance against extractive projects, some of the 
most marginalized groups in Guatemala - indigenous people and the rural poor - are faced 
with a climate of hostility and violence, and experience repression and criminalization 
aimed at undermining their activism (Global Witness, 2017). Despite this, we find that 
environmental struggles in Guatemala reveal how grassroots mobilizations can - however 
modestly - subvert hegemonic power relations in their struggles for environmental justice 
and transformative politics.      
Our analysis draws on data gathered through fieldwork from 2013-2017, using 
primarily qualitative research methods such as interviews, observant participation and 
document analysis. Our analysis includes the perspectives from a wide range of diverse 
actors, including indigenous leaders, environmental activists, and rural small holding 
farmers involved in anti-extractive movements, as well as the legal advisors representing 
them, and allied organizations. We also interviewed corporate representatives, groups and 
associations that promote private sector interests, lawyers, public servants, as well as 
powerful political and economic elites. Participant observation with the aforementioned 
actors included visits to projects sites and participation in private sector conferences, as 
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well as participating in anti-extractive demonstrations, meetings and public court 
hearings. 
Following this introduction, the paper is outlined as follows: the second section 
presents some theoretical considerations for understanding the emancipatory and 
constraining elements of the law and of engaging in contentious politics through legal 
mechanisms. The third section examines why subaltern actors increasingly turn to the law 
in their struggles. The fourth section then analyzes the ways in which the Guatemalan 
anti-mining movement has mobilized the law in its endeavors. Finally, a discussion and 
conclusion are presented.   
2. Theoretical considerations: The emancipatory and regulatory dimensions of law 
Law configures social space in ways that has consequences for justice and 
injustice in the world (Delaney, 2016, p. 268). It can be understood as constitutive of 
social reality in the naïve sense that the operation of law as a force in the world causes 
things to happen. “Law is all over” (Sarat, 1990, p. 343).  It is constitutive of the 
institutional world within which we act. It is literally constitutive of the nation state, the 
community, the firm, the market, the family and nature (Blomley, Delaney, & Ford, 
2001, p. xv).  It is the inscription of rules and regulations, the recognition or withholding 
of rights, and enactment of the privileges of authority at all scales. Law draws lines, 
constructs insides and outsides, assigns legal meanings to lines, and attaches legal 
consequences to crossing them. Law defines certain types of personhood and identities 
(citizens, lovers, owners, workers, refugees, children etc.) and as such, it is constitutive of 
how lives are enacted and experienced (Delaney, 2015, 2016). Law fixes hegemonic 
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visions of nature and ‘appropriate’ human-environment relations, determining access and 
control over land, water, the subsoil and natural resources (Sundberg, 2008). 
Law is also an instrument of repression and a pervasive means of reproducing 
dominant patterns of power relations and hegemony (Sieder, 2011). It is shaped by the 
broad social, political-economic structures within which it exists, past and present. These 
include, at the least, the dynamic configurations of global capitalism, the international 
system of states and organizations (including corporations and international 
organizations), and ideological frameworks, such as colonialism, racism, and 
neoliberalism (Delaney, 2016; Sundberg, 2008). Law can be viewed as benefitting the 
interests of those in power, such as elites and transnational corporations, because of the 
ways in which legal practices privilege those who can most potently play by the rules of 
the game. Corporate capitalism and elites often successfully mobilize ‘lawfare19’ to 
further their political and economic ends, while those who act in the name of the state 
mobilize lawfare when they conjure with legalities to act against its citizens, often 
through criminalization and repression (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2006). Some scholars see 
law as depoliticizing conflict, for example by regulations that prevent labor from 
engaging in civil resistance or provoking radical change (Eckert et al., 2012, p. 4) or 
through a “fetishism of the law,” whereby the central role of politics is displaced to the 
courts (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2006, p. 49). Similarly, some postcolonial scholars 
argue that the law alienates subalterns from their own languages and experiences (Das, 
1989; Kirsch, 2012).  
                                                
19 “Lawfare” is “the resort to legal instruments…to commit acts of political coercion” (Comaroff 
& Comaroff, 2006, p. 30) 
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And yet, law can also be an instrument of change and resistance, and a means by 
which justice might be realized through counterhegemonic struggles (Blomley et al., 
2001; Rodríguez Garavito & Santos, 2005; Santos, 2002). Law, in particular rights 
related norms and instruments, holds out an emancipatory promise to people across the 
world. This emancipatory promise that has long been invoked by oppressed peoples, for 
example, appeals to citizenship by those, such as women and slaves, who were 
systematically denied formal citizenship rights (Sieder, 2011, pp. 240–241). The law is 
not static. It is not a closed system without contingency, inevitably reproducing 
hegemonic power relations. Rather, law is open-ended, and legal rules and concepts are 
open to interpretation (Kirsch, 2014). Even as they are “fixed”, at least partially, in 
specific legal instruments, interpretations and meanings are subject to ongoing 
contestation and reinterpretation by different actors. This is particularly evident where 
international norms and rights discourses are used or invoked to challenge national laws 
and situated practices. Legal systems and engagements with the law can be understood as 
contested sites of meaning where dominant ideals and values provide the framework for 
contestation and for advancing alternative understandings and practices. In this way, law 
is constantly negotiated and reshaped in a dynamic dialectic between hegemonic 
projections and counterhegemonic actions (Nielsen & Nilsen, 2015; Rodríguez Garavito 
& Santos, 2005; Santos, 2002; Sieder, 2011). This is not to suggest that legal strategies 
are a panacea for those engaged in environmental struggles. We are acutely aware of the 
irreducible complexity of the dialectics of resistance and the law (Comaroff & Comaroff, 
2006; Nielsen & Nilsen, 2015). We understand that without dismantling systems of 
oppression that produce and reproduce socio-spatial inequalities to begin with, law will 
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likely favor those who benefit from such systems to begin with. Yet, as Green (2002) 
points out, subaltern groups do not mobilize at a distance from the institutional and 
symbolic modalities through which hegemony is constructed, but rather in and through 
these (Nielsen & Nilsen, 2015). Consequently, the institutions, discourses, and 
technologies of rule that attach to the state also become sites of contention where 
subaltern resistance can be articulated and pursued (Gramsci, 1998, p. 52). The work of 
grassroots actors and social movements engaged in counterhegemonic resistance 
highlighting these instances, which relates to the questions we raise in our paper, namely, 
how grassroots actors engaged in environmental struggles are able to mobilize through 
these ‘legal’ forms of political action (Nilsen, 2012). Finally, it is important to point out 
that we do not see the mobilization of the law as replacing collective action and civil 
resistance in contentious politics and environmental struggles. Rather, we see strategic, 
grassroots driven litigation and counterhegemonic legal resistance as forming part of 
broader political struggles and complementing existing repertoires of contention 
(Rodríguez Garavito & Santos, 2005, p. 15).  
3. Changing legal opportunity structures and growing rights consciousness 
To understand why subaltern actors involved in environmental struggles 
increasingly include legal discourses and legal mechanisms as part of their repertoires of 
contention we need to first look to recent global and national developments. The last 
couple of decades have seen the global spread of international human rights norms in 
tandem with the increasing incorporation of social, economic and cultural rights into 
national constitutions (Sieder, 2011; Tate & Vallinder, 1995). At the same time, changes 
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in legal and regulatory frameworks stemming from decentralization processes have 
transformed the ways in which the citizens, corporations and the state engage with and 
through the law. Constitutional courts and supreme courts are also more active in 
counterbalancing the executive and legislative than ever before, and high courts have 
begun to recast themselves as defenders of rights, intervening in political and social 
conflicts (Couso, Huneeus, & Sieder, 2010; Sieder, Schjolden, & Angell, 2009). As a 
result, subaltern actors and grassroots movements increasingly draw on rights-based 
discourses and incorporate legal strategies into their political struggles. This growing 
‘rights consciousness’, that is, ‘a willingness, or eagerness, to make use of institutions 
(like courts) which enforce rights, or which decide when rights have been infringed on or 
broken’ (Friedman, 2002, p. 38) is a key factor in explaining the growth of strategic 
litigation as part of political and social struggle. The combination of new legal 
opportunity structures and growing rights consciousness means that processes of 
grassroots driven legal action – or legal action ‘from below’ – are now taking place in a 
range of different contexts and across scales (Sieder, 2011, p. 241). 
In Guatemala, these developments are shaped by, among other things, legislative 
and political changes related to post-war democratization, as well as the profound 
reshaping of the relations between state, market and citizens stemming from economic 
liberalization favoring a minimalist state (Sveinsdóttir et al., forthcoming). These changes 
included the increasing codification of the collective rights of indigenous peoples, as well 
as the implementation of decentralization legislation intended to strengthen 
‘participation’ of civil society actors in local decision-making processes by transferring 
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certain responsibilities from central to ‘lower’ administrative levels, such as departments, 
municipalities and communities (Aguilar-Støen, 2015; Sieder, 2011; Urkidi, 2011).  
Decentralization legislation also transferred responsibilities relating to 
environmental governance from the state and to the private sector. For example, the 
responsibility of evaluating and mitigating the potential impacts of projects through the 
undertaking of Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) now lies with project owners, 
as well as the facilitation of citizen participation in such processes. Tensions between 
these contradictory ideas about participation, rights and environmental governance sees 
affected communities generating counterhegemonic, grassroots driven forms of 
environmental governance practices, such as community referendums, and challenging 
hegemonic notions of ‘participation’ through their contestation of EIAs and technocratic, 
market-driven ideas about Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) (Aguilar-Støen & 
Hirsch, 2015, 2017). As they do, they increasingly draw on legal discourses and 
mechanisms to advance their claims.  
There are several legal instruments and norms that are of particular importance to 
public participation in environmental decision-making in Guatemala, and which relate to 
mobilizations against extractive industries. Relating to the collective rights of indigenous 
peoples is, most importantly, the International Labour Organization’s Convention 
concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (No. 169) (ILO 169 hereafter) ratified by 
Guatemala in 199620. Guatemala’s Decentralization Law (Decree 14-2002), Municipal 
Code (Decree 12-2002), and Urban and Rural Development Council Law (Decree 11-
                                                
20 Guatemala is also a signatory to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (UNDRIP) and the Organization of the Americas’ (OAS) American Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples. However, these figure less significantly in our analysis.  
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2002) all regulate citizen participation in local decision-making processes and play an 
important role in community referendums. The legal and regulatory frameworks of the 
Guatemalan mining and energy sectors are also of importance. Of particular importance 
for our case are the Mining Law (Decree 48-97), regulating mining activities, and the 
General Law of Electricity (Decree 93-96), which regulates hydropower activities. The 
Regulation of Environmental Evaluation, Control and Monitoring (Ministry of 
Environment and Natural Resources, Government Agreement 137-2016) is also of 
importance as is applies to EIAs and FPIC.  
3.1. Decentralization and citizen participation 
Growing rights consciousness, alongside legislative and regulatory changes 
stemming from domestic-level decentralization shape the contested terrain of 
environmental governance (Walter & Urkidi, 2017). These changes have transformed the 
ways in which citizens, corporations and the state engage with one another. Legislative 
changes also impact new opportunity structures from within which grassroots actors and 
social movements mobilize the law to advance their claims (Domingo, 2010). In 
Guatemala, decentralization reforms were first proposed in the 1980s and then later 
during the peace process in the 1990s. Decentralization was proposed not only as a way 
to improve governance and institutional service delivery, but also to grant indigenous 
people more political autonomy, as well as to increase citizen participation (Costanza, 
2016). A range of actors including domestic elites, international donors, 
intergovernmental organizations, international financial institutions, civil society and 
indigenous movements took part in these reformations, often attempting to advance 
conflicting visions of the state and governance. Some laws and policies were crafted with 
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strong influence from the private sector21, whereas others responded to pressure from 
civil society and development cooperation agencies (Aguilar-Støen, 2015; Aguilar-Støen 
& Hirsch, 2017; Dougherty, 2011).  
Decentralization legislation was approved by the Guatemalan Congress in 2002 
and was articulated in three laws: The General Law of Decentralization (Decree 14-
2002), the Municipal Code (Decree 12-2002), and the Urban and Rural Development 
Council Law (Decree 11-2002). These laws included measures to formalize citizen 
participation in local government by establishing community-level and municipal-level 
‘Development Councils,’ and granting the right to community consultation, both 
indigenous and non-indigenous. The Municipal Code (Decree 12-2002) refers to 
community consultation in the following terms: Article 17 confers on residents the right 
to participate in consultations in accordance with the law, as well as the right to demand 
public consultation of issues that are of great importance to the municipality. On the basis 
of Article 63, the Municipal Council (COMUDE), through a two-thirds majority of all its 
members, can decide to hold a consultation (…) “when the importance of an issue 
suggests the need to consult the opinion of the residents” (Municipal Code, Decree 12-
2002, Article 63). In addition, residents have the right, through the signatures of at least 
10% of the residents registered in the municipality, to demand that consultation be held 
on issues of a general nature that affect all the residents of the municipality. “The results 
would be binding if at least twenty per cent (20%) of the registered residents participate 
and the majority of the votes in favour of the issue under consultation” (Municipal Code, 
                                                
21 See Dougherty (2011) and Aguilar-Støen (2015) for an analysis of how the private sector 
played an influential role in the drafting of the 1997 Mining Law.  
 70 
Decree 12-2002, Article 64). Finally, the Municipal Code also contains specific 
regulations regarding consultations in such cases where the issue at hand particularly 
affects the rights of and interests of indigenous communities and authorities in a given 
municipality. In such cases, “the Municipal Council will carry out consultation at the 
request of the indigenous communities or authorities, while taking into consideration the 
specific criteria determined by the customs and traditions of the said indigenous 
communities” (Municipal Code, Decree 12-2002, Article 65).  
With respect to the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court in the matter, the 
High Court has ruled that the right to conduct consultation procedures on issues of 
community interests lies with the Municipal Council. It also declared that a lack of 
internal legislation in that respect “cannot lead to this right being nullified” 
(Constitutional Court, Record 1408-2005). For the most part, the Court has ruled that 
community referendums are non-binding (The Observatory, 2015, p. 14). However, in 
2013, the Constitutional Court set an important legal precedent when it recognized the 
results of the Mataquescuintla municipal consultation as legally binding22. This was the 
first time the Constitutional Court considered the results of a community referendum 
regarding a mining project as binding. Since then Guatemala has witnessed a rapidly 
evolving jurisprudence with important and precedent setting cases such the Escobal case, 
which we shall discuss in more detail later in the paper.  
Much of the literature on the Guatemalan anti-mining movement describes anti-
mining mobilizations as indigenous struggles, which indeed they are, particularly in the 
Western Highlands (Laplante & Nolin, 2014; Nolin & Stephens, 2010; Sieder, 2007, 
                                                
22 Constitutional Court, Records: 4639-2012 and 4646-2012 
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2011; Yagenova & Garcia, 2009). However, anti-mining struggles in Guatemala are far 
from monolithic and include indigenous and non-indigenous groups alike, particularly in 
southeastern Guatemala (Aguilar-Støen, 2015; Walter & Urkidi, 2017). As such, 
community-consulting processes are heterogeneous, with non-indigenous communities 
drawing on the Municipal Code and the Development Council Law, whereas indigenous 
communities also appeal to the ILO Convention 169. This makes the Guatemalan case 
interesting among other things, because of the synergies between multi-ethnic anti-
mining movements, the COCODES, and the COMUDES in the organization of 
consultations (Urkidi, 2011; Walter & Urkidi, 2017).  
3.2. Indigenous justice and the ILO Convention 169 
In Guatemala official multiculturalism and indigenous justice remain weak 
(Sieder, 2007, 2011, 2017). Rather than reflecting an organic process generated in 
response to a consolidated mass movement of indigenous peoples, the incorporation of 
indigenous justice into Guatemalan national law is best understood as a consequence of 
an internationally brokered peace process (Sieder, 2007, 2011). The impact of thirty-six 
years of civil war, in particular the counterinsurgency warfare inflicted upon the civilian 
population during the early 1980s, had a devastating effect on popular organization 
(Brett, 2016; Sieder, 2011). Guatemala’s civil war, which lasted from 1960 to 1996, 
produced some of Latin America’s most terrible instances of state terror that culminated 
in acts of genocide. Counterinsurgency warfare saw more than 200,000 people murdered 
during the war, the majority of which were non-combatant indigenous Maya. Another 
50,000 people were disappeared, their whereabouts unknown and their bodies buried in 
clandestine graves throughout the country (CEH, 2012; ODAH, 1998). The widespread 
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operationalization of disappearances became a signature tactic of the Guatemalan military 
and was used to terrorize, punish and silence the civilian population (Brett, 2016). 
Guatemala’s state formation was one that combined democracy with virulent anti-
communist counterinsurgency, which built on long-evolving patterns of rural repression 
and deeply embedded racism that served to organize unequal socio-spatial relations in 
colonial and postcolonial Guatemala (Brett, 2016; Casaús Arzú, 2010). To this day 
counterinsurgency structures remain incorporated into the very heart of the Guatemalan 
state and continue to condition individual and collective actions (Sieder, 2011; 
Sveinsdóttir, Aguilar-Støen, and Bull, forthcoming). 
The signing of the Peace Accords in 1996, which marked the end of the war, did 
little to address many of the root causes of the civil war, such as inequality, highly 
skewed land distribution, deeply rooted racism and the exclusion of the indigenous 
population from civil and political participation (Sveinsdóttir, Aguilar-Støen, and Bull, 
forthcoming). Nonetheless, the Peace Accords offered fairly strong support of 
multiculturalism and indigenous rights, and the peace process resulted in significant 
agreements between the government and guerrillas designed to respect indigenous rights 
and recognition (Sieder, 2011). One of the promises of the Peace Accords was that the 
government would reform the Constitution to recognize indigenous peoples’ right to 
exercise their own ‘customary’ law (Sieder, 2011). However, the required constitutional 
reforms never materialized. In May 1999, a national referendum - the ‘Consulta Popular’ 
– rejected the reforms proposed in the Peace Accords, leaving hard-won concessions 
from the state on issues like indigenous rights and reforms to the military in limbo 
(McAllister & Nelson, 2013; Sieder, 2007, 2011, 2017). A sustained campaign by the 
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powerful right-wing elite and the private sector alleged that recognizing indigenous law 
would “balkanize” the country and encourage “reverse discrimination” against the non-
indigenous (Sieder, 2017, p. 371). The failure of the ‘Consulta Popular’ suggests that the 
rights of indigenous people to exercise their own forms of authority and law remain 
unrecognized23 (Sieder, 2007, p. 219). The failure to recognize ‘customary law’ in the 
Constitution means that decisions made by indigenous authorities could be overturned by 
the courts claiming indigenous law is unconstitutional, since the Constitution gives 
exclusive jurisdiction to the judiciary. In the absence of constitutional reform, indigenous 
justice, remains extremely weak in Guatemala (Sieder, 2007, p. 219). 
Nonetheless, the ratification of the ILO Convention 169 by the Guatemalan 
Congress in 1996 provided legal basis for the official recognition of indigenous rights:24 
 “Rights guaranteed by the Convention include equality of opportunity and treatment, 
protections of indigenous peoples’ religion and spiritual values and customs, rights to 
ownership and possession of traditionally valued lands, and rights to appropriate 
forms of health and educational provisions” (Sieder, 2010, p. 166).  
The Convention also commits governments to recognizing the jurisdictional 
autonomy of indigenous peoples and their right to administer their own forms of justice, 
as long as they respect fundamental and internationally recognized human rights (Sieder, 
2011, p. 247). The Convention also states the right of indigenous peoples to prior 
consultation on development projects affecting their livelihoods (Sieder, 2011, p. 248).  
                                                
23 Sieder has written extensively about judicial reform, access to justice and legal pluralities in 
Guatemala. We refer to her work for those interested in a more thorough reading of such prosses 
in Guatemala. See (Sieder, 2007, 2010, 2011, 2017). 
 
 
24 For an indepth discussion of the ILO Convention 169 in Guatemala see  (Xiloj, 2016) 
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The ILO Convention 169 is the first international instrument dealing with 
indigenous people’s rights that is binding on its signatory states, and as such the 
Convention has been binding to the state of Guatemala since its ratification in April 1996 
(Sieder, 2007, 2011; The Observatory, 2015). In the absence of the constitutional reforms 
needed to recognize ‘customary law,’ indigenous actors and their allies have increasingly 
pursued other avenues to obtain recognition, including by bringing cases before the 
Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court, arguing that Guatemala’s ratification of the 
ILO Convention 169 commits the state to recognize indigenous autonomy for communal 
governance. The Constitutional Court has issued several rulings reaffirming the legality 
of the measures applied by indigenous authorities, establishing an emergent jurisprudence 
favouring the jurisdictional autonomy of indigenous peoples (Sieder, 2017, p. 371).  
3.3. The Mining Law, EIAs and public participation 
The legal and regulatory framework of the Guatemalan mining sector reflects the 
market logic of post-war economic liberalization and decentralization. As previously 
mentioned, one of the results of decentralization was the transferal of responsibilities 
relating to environmental governance were from the state to the private sector. Under 
Guatemala’s 1997 Mining Law (Decree 48-97), companies seeking mining concessions 
and exploitation licenses must complete an EIA to be evaluated by the Ministry of 
Environment and Natural Resources (known by its acronym in Spanish, MARN), which 
is the public agency responsible for the approval of the EIA. The current EIA process is 
regulated under the 2016 Regulations on Environmental Evaluation, Control and 
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Monitoring25, which stipulate that responsibility of carrying out the EIA falls on the 
mining company itself, although the EIA process must follow the MARN guidelines. The 
EIA regulations also confer the responsibility of facilitating public participation of 
communities affected by mining projects onto mining companies themselves, shifting this 
responsibility from the state to private actors (Aguilar-Støen, 2015; Aguilar-Støen & 
Hirsch, 2015, 2017). Once an EIA is completed it is to be made public for 30 days at the 
MARN, located in the capital city. A notice is given to the public that an EIA has been 
submitted and is available for comment. In practice this usually means publishing a 
notice in a newspaper or on the radio. Recently, EIAs under review have also become 
available on the MARN website26, but the layout is cumbersome and EIAs are only 
available in Spanish27. While the EIA regulations state that affected communities should 
be included throughout the entire EIA process28, this is rarely the case in Guatemala, and 
the only ‘formal’ space available to challenge the EIA’s is during the 30-day comment 
period (Aguilar-Støen & Hirsch, 2017; Amnesty International, 2014). A group of U.S. 
engineers that were solicited to independently audit several Guatemalan mining EIAs 
reported that the 30-day comment period on exploitation licenses and EIAs is far too 
short. The briefness of the comment period handicaps government agencies and the 
                                                






27 There are at least 22 languages spoken in Guatemala and many of the speakers of those 
languages do not speak Spanish or have Spanish as a second or third language.  
 
  
28 Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, Government Agreement 137-2016, article 43. 
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public from providing thorough and thoughtful response. The engineers concluded that 
the period should be several months long (Robinson, Lauderman, & Montgomery, 2012).    
It is well documented that practices of EIAs in Guatemala are rife with 
irregularities and deficiencies, and often, outright duplicity and manipulation on behalf of 
mining companies29. For example, in the landmark conflict surrounding the Marlin mine, 
consultations took place largely after the company completed its EIA, and long after the 
mine’s concession was issued in 1996 (Amnesty International, 2014). In 2005, the 
Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO) of the International Finance Corporation of the 
World Bank carried out an assessment of the Marlin mining conflict, noting that “public 
disclosure prepared by the company – including the [EIA] – were highly technical and 
did not at the time have sufficient information to allow for an informed view of the likely 
adverse impacts of the project” (Office of the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman 
International Finance Corporation, 2005, p. ii). In 2011, the UN Special Rapporteur on 
the Rights of Indigenous peoples concluded that there had been no consultation in the 
case of the Marlin mine that conformed to applicable international standards such the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Anaya, 2011, p. 31).  
Consultation processes were also far from satisfactory in the case of the ‘Tambor’ 
mining project30, where affected communities only found out about the project after the 
exploitation license was granted (Aguilar-Støen & Hirsch, 2017, p. 229). The Escobal 
                                                




30 Popularly referred to as ‘La Puya’ - the name of the movement that opposes the “El Tambor - 
Progreso VII Derivada” mining project. See (Pedersen, 2014, 2018) for thorough discussion on 
the La Puya resistance.  
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mining conflict in southeastern Guatemala follows similar patters to the Marlin and 
Tambor projects. Affected communities reported that they were neither involved in 
public participation nor consulted. In fact, from day one, the Escobal project was 
characterized by a lack of transparency on behalf of the mining company and affected 
populations claim they were never fully informed about the plans surrounding the project 
(Solano, 2015b). In addition to compliance failures regarding public participation 
requirements, all of the EIAs for the three mining projects were found to have serious 
shortcomings with regard to evaluations of potential environmental impacts, particularly 
with regard to water issues (Aguilar-Støen & Hirsch, 2017; Robinson et al., 2012). 
It is safe to say that EIA practices in the Guatemalan mining sector have 
precluded any type of meaningful participation, consultation or consent from affected 
communities, non-indigenous and indigenous alike. Not only are EIAs shrouded by a lack 
of transparency, they are often used as a technical device to delimit and control public 
participation. EIAs are also almost invariably in Spanish, and EIAs are, by their nature, 
largely technical document (Aguilar-Støen & Hirsch, 2015, p. 478). Out of frustration 
with being excluded from having a say in processes that affect their territories, their 
livelihoods, and their cultural survival, affected communities increasingly react by 
contesting hegemonic environmental governance practices, such as EIAs, by creating 
their own mechanisms for governance and political action.  
In the following section we analyze the ways in which communities affected by 
mining projects have responded to exclusion from environmental decision-making 
processes. While decentralization has meant that the responsibility of facilitating public 
participation of affected communities falls upon the private sector, national laws 
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governing participation, as well as international instruments safeguarding indigenous 
rights, allow affected communities to have a say in environmental governance. While 
these results are often contradictory and conflicting, new forms of political action are 
shaping an emergent jurisprudence of mining conflicts.  
4. Community consultations and citizen participation as counterhegemonic 
resistance  
Since the early 2000s, unprecedented environmental struggles led by strong 
grassroots movements have emerged in response to the imposition of mining and 
hydroelectric projects in Guatemala (Aguilar-Støen, 2016). These grassroots movements 
include some of the most marginalized groups in Guatemala – indigenous people and the 
rural poor. Their resistance addresses a range of interrelated concerns, including claims to 
political autonomy; the rights to lands and territories; the unjust burden of environmental 
risk and degradation; the politics of livelihood and cultural survival.  
The previous sections of the paper outlined an analytic framework for 
understanding both why and how anti-mining movements mobilize the law. Our aim is to 
argue that, using grassroots driven, counterhegemonic mechanism of environmental 
governance, subaltern actors attempt to subvert hegemonic power relations in 
environmental struggles. People affected by mining related environmental injustices 
resist their exclusion from environmental governance by creating ‘hybrid-mechanisms for 
participation,’ (Cf. Walter & Urkidi, 2017, p. 276) and by constructing ‘alternative legal 
orders’ (Sieder, 2017, p. 15). In this following section, we analyze the evolving political 
actions of three anti-mining movements that are of importance to the emergent 
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Guatemalan jurisprudence of public participation and consultation. We examine how 
these actors have mobilized to develop political tools and grassroots-driven mechanisms 
for environmental governance, political participation and political contestation.  
4.1 The Guatemalan anti-mining movement  
The first transnational mining project in Guatemala was the El Estor nickel mine, 
which was operated from 1977 to 1982 by the International Nickel Company of Canada, 
Ltd. (INCO) through its Guatemalan subsidiary, EXMIBAL. During the lifetime of the 
mine, the army and mining personnel committed severe human rights violations against 
the area’s residents (CEH, 2012; Fox, 2015; Nolin & Stephens, 2010; Solano, 2005, 
2005; Urkidi, 2011). The project, which is in the Izabal region, was revived in 1994 as 
the ‘Fenix project’ and has since then changed hands between different Canadian mining 
companies, most recently being acquired by a Russian company. The project continues to 
be plagued with accounts of terrible human rights violations and violent evictions 
(Crystal, Imai, & Maheandiran, 2014; Fox, 2015; Nolin & Stephens, 2010). However, it 
is the emergence of the Marlin mine in 2003 that marks the starting point of the current 
cycle of mining conflicts in Guatemala (Urkidi, 2011, p. 563). Residents in the 
municipalities affected by the mine, San Juan Ixtahuacán and Sipakapa, located in the 
San Marcos department, were neither adequately informed nor consulted prior to the 
construction of the mine. In response an anti-mining movement then began to take shape 
between December 2004 and January 2005 as construction of the mine was underway 
(Dougherty, 2011). The conflict began to escalate when in December 2004 a group of 
indigenous anti-mining activist and rural farmers organized a blockade in Los Encuentros 
in Sololá. For more than thirty days the group blocked mining equipment from 
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proceeding to the mining site in San Marcos. However, the blockade came to an end in 
January 2005 when the Guatemalan government called in security forces to escort the 
equipment convoy to the mine. At the time, Guatemalan President Oscar Berger was 
widely reported saying, “we have to protect the investors” (Nolin & Stephens, 2010). The 
police and military fiercely repressed the anti-mining protesters, resulting in the death of 
Raúl Castro Boce, a member of the group, and the injuries of sixteen other people 
(Dougherty, 2011; Eccarius‐Kelly, 2007; Nolin & Stephens, 2010; Yagenova & Garcia, 
2009). Following the events in Los Encuentros the opposition against the Marlin mine 
began to gain broader notice within Guatemala and the anti-mining movement began to 
spread.  
4.2 The Sipakapa community referendum   
 In 2005, Sipakapa became the first municipality to carry out a community 
consultation on mining in Guatemala, a process that became a milestone in the history of 
contemporary anti-mining movements in Guatemala (Urkidi, 2011; Yagenova & Garcia, 
2009). Following the events at Los Encuentros, the municipal authorities of Sipakapa 
announced that they would hold a public consultation on the mining operations, based on 
the Municipal Code and the ILO 169. The consultation was to be carried out through 
open community assemblies in different villages according to “indigenous customary 
law.” The mining company immediately tried to obstruct the process by submitting an 
injunction to order the municipality to postpone the proceedings. However, the 
Constitutional Court rejected the appeal. The pressure from the mining company caused 
municipal authorities to temporarily back down from their plans to go through with the 
public consultation. However, the local COCODE – established by the 2002 
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decentralization legislation - carried the consultation regardless on June 18, 2005 (Sieder, 
2010, p. 174; Sieder, 2011). Eleven out of the thirteen villages that participated in the 
referendum voted against mining, one in favour and the other abstained (Gramajo Bauer, 
2011; Sieder, 2010, p. 174).  
Following the community consultation, the Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM) 
(the government institution responsible for the granting of mining licenses) filed an 
injunction to the Constitutional Court, claiming that the community consultation was 
unconstitutional. Two years later, in 2007, the Constitutional Court ruled that COMUDEs 
and municipalities do indeed have the right to conduct consultation procedures on issues 
of community interests. However, the Court found the community consultation non-
binding because such conventions and laws were imprecise and not in accordance with 
the constitution (Walter & Urkidi, 2017; Xiloj & Porras, 2008). Yet, the Court also 
declared that a lack of internal legislation in that respect “cannot lead to this right being 
nullified31.”  
Because the Constitutional Court found the results of the Sipakapa consultation to be 
non-binding, the mine continued to operate from 2005 to 2017, remaining controversial 
and contested throughout its lifetime32. However, the importance of the Sipakapa process 
to the Guatemalan anti-mining movement cannot be understated. The Sipakapa 
                                                
31 Constitutional Court, Record: 1408-2005. 
 
 
32 In 2010, after a study conducted by the activist group Physicians for Human Rights determined 
that the mine posed serious health risks to the communities living downstream, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights called for the suspension of the mine. The state initially 
indicated that it would comply with the precautionary measure but subsequently petitioned the 
court to allow the mine to continue operating (Kirsch, 2014, p. 291).  
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consultation process set in motion what has become one of the most important 
mechanisms used by subaltern actors involved in environmental struggles in Guatemala.   
4.3 The ‘La Puya’ resistance and the Tambor mining project    
The ‘La Puya’ resistance refers to an anti-mining movement that opposes the ‘El 
Tambor - Progreso VII Derivada’ mine, located in the municipalities of San Pedro 
Ayampuc and San José del Golfo, 20 km north of Guatemala City (Aguilar-Støen & 
Hirsch, 2017). Here, again, communities affected by the mine were excluded from public 
participation processes mandated by the EIA regulations and the ILO 169. By the time 
the affected communities found out about the project, the 30-day comments period, 
stipulated by the EIA regulations, was already over, making it too late to challenge the 
EIA (Aguilar-Støen & Hirsch, 2017). The project’s exploitation license was granted in 
November 2011 and in February 2012 construction of the mine began. Because of the 
attention garnered by the Marlin conflict, a national anti-mining movement had started to 
develop in Guatemala. By 2012 increasing knowledge about mining resistance began to 
spread as nascent activist-networks increasingly shared their experiences of collective 
resistance against mining. In March 2012, the peaceful encampment of La Puya was 
established at the entrance of the El Tambor mine site (Pedersen, 2018). The La Puya 
resistance movement managed to maintain its peaceful blockade at the entrance of the 
mine until the mine’s license was suspended in 2016, successfully disturbing the 
operations of the mine – although such successes came at a great cost, with members of 
the movement suffering violence, repression and criminalization (Pedersen, 2018).   
In 2014, the La Puya movement initiated processes of legal action against the 
mining project. In August that year, members of the anti-mining movement, working 
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with a domestic environmental NGO, brought a case against the MEM and its sitting 
minister, Erick Archila. The case cited failure to comply with public participation 
regulations during the EIA process and failure to consult with indigenous peoples 
affected by the project, as established by the ILO 169. In October of that same year, 
community members from El Carrizal and El Guapinol in San Pedro Ayampuc also filed 
an injunction against the COMUDE for allowing the construction of a mining project 
without guaranteeing proper consultation and protecting the interests of affected 
communities (Pedersen, 2018). Finally, in July 2015, the La Puya movement achieved a 
considerable victory when a Guatemalan appeals court ruled in favor of residents right to 
prior consultation (Aguilar-Støen & Hirsch, 2017). The mining company was ordered to 
suspend all construction activities until a community consultation was held. However, the 
company ignored the court ruling and continued operations. In February 2016, the 
Guatemalan Supreme Court reaffirmed the decision of the appeals court, giving notice of 
the suspension of the mine’s license based on the lack of consultation with indigenous 
peoples in the area. Yet again, the mine continued to operate despite its license being 
suspended. Then in March 2016, the MEM enforced the injunction suspending the 
mining company’s license. Finally, in August 2016, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its 
suspension of the Tambor mining license due to lack of free, prior and informed consent 
of indigenous peoples in the area33 (Pedersen, 2018). Since then the Tambor mining 
project remains suspended but has been caught up in scandals and charges, relating, for 
example, to stolen Mayan archeological artifacts and ties to corruption scandals. 
                                                
33 Guatemalan Supreme Court (Corte Suprema de Justicia, Amparo 1246-2016).  
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The 2016 suspension of the Tambor mining license is important because it was 
the first time Guatemalan courts ruled that an exploitation license be suspended for 
failure to consult indigenous communities in environmental decision-making processes. 
The case of La Puya shows how anti-mining movements can use the courts to contest 
EIAs and environmental governance practices and claim back their right to participate in 
decision-making processes, however modestly (Aguilar-Støen & Hirtsch, 2017).  
4.4 The Escobal mine and the anti-mining movement in southeastern Guatemala 
 The Escobal mining concession is located in the municipality of San Rafael Las 
Flores, about 73 kilometers east of Guatemala City, in the department of Santa Rosa. 
Rumors of the proposed mine began to circulate when in 2007 exploration licenses were 
granted to a Canadian mining company and preliminary mineral exploration began in the 
area. The exploration licenses extended into the municipalities of San Rafael Las Flores 
and Casillas in the department of Santa Rosa, the municipalities of San Carlos Alzatate 
and Mataquescuintla in Jalapa, and San José Pinula in the department of Guatemala. All 
in all the mining concession includes over twenty-three licenses that expand into the 
department of Santa Rosa, Jalapa and Jutiapa.  
Residents in the municipalities affected by the mine’s operations expressed that, 
from the start, they were never fully informed about the mining project. In late 2009, a 
group of residents in San Rafael Las Flores met to get informed and discuss the potential 
impacts of the mine, which led to the founding of the Committee in Defense of Life and 
Peace (CDP). Following the lead from San Rafael Las Flores, residents in neighboring 
municipalities began to gather through meetings facilitated by the Catholic Church in 
Casillas in order to learn about the rising concerns regarding mining activities in the area. 
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Indigenous Xinka communities, forming part of the ‘Parliament of the Xinka People of 
Guatemala’ (PAPXGIUA), also joined these discussions. A result of these meetings was 
the establishment of the Diocese Commission for the Defence of Nature (CODIDENA), 
which brought together the voices of different groups and organizations in the region. 
CODIDENA and the CDP worked together to carry out educational and awareness 
initiatives in the communities, providing advice about how to hold community 
consultations. Later down the road they also helped provide legal support to members of 
the anti-mining movement that were facing criminalization by the mining company and 
the government (Solano, 2015, pp. 7-8). 
One of the strategies used by the anti-mining movement in southeastern 
Guatemala was to emphasize the legal right to prior consultation. The Committee for 
Defence of Life and Peace, CODIDENA and the Xinka Parliament, aided by two national 
NGOs – The Centre for Legal Environmental and Social Action (CALAS) and Madre 
Selva – encouraged residents in Casillas, Nueva Santa Rosa, Santa Rosa de Lima and 
Mataquescuintla to appeal to their COCODEs and COMUDEs to hold local and 
municipal referendums regarding the mining project. In 2011 and 2012, municipal 
consultations were held in Nueva Santa Rosa, Santa Rosa de Lima, Casillas and 
Mataquescuintla at the request of municipal residents. The consultations were premised 
on articles 60-66 of the Municipal Code, as well as Article 28 of the Constitution. All of 
the four referendums concluded in a resounding NO to mining. However, no municipal 
consultation took place in San Rafael Las Flores, where, despite formal requests from the 
population, municipal authorities, who were pro-mining at the time, had refused to hold a 
municipal consultation.  
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Despite the growing opposition to the mining project and the results of the 
municipal referendums, the Escobal EIA was approved by MARN in October 2011, 
clearing the way for the construction of the mine. Then, in April 2013, the MEM 
announced that it had granted the mineral extraction license for the Escobal project. In 
early 2013, both leading up to the granting of the Escobal extraction license and in the 
days following it, eight consultations were carried out in the Municipality of San Rafael 
Las Flores, using the COCODE law (Decree 11-2002). During this same period the 
situation in the area keep escalating, with killings, kidnappings and shootings taking 
place between January and April 2013. In May that same year, the Guatemalan 
government declared a “state of siege” in the municipalities closest to the mine, 
deploying thousands of troops to the area and temporarily suspending constitutional 
rights in the region. Otto Perez Molina, the then-president, justified the state of siege – 
which can be likened to martial law – on grounds of terrorism and drug trafficking threats 
(Sveinsdóttir, Aguilar-Støen & Bull, forthcoming).  
The state of siege and the criminalization of activists that followed brought a halt 
to consultations processes being organized in other communities and municipalities 
(Solano, 2015). It took six months before another municipal consultation was carried out 
in the municipality of Jalapa. In this referendum, the Xinka communities of Santa María 
Xalapán voted overwhelmingly against mining.  Finally, in December 2013, the 
Constitutional Court set an important legal precedent when it recognized the results of the 
2011 Mataquescuintla municipal consultation as legally binding34. This was the first time 
                                                
34 Constitutional Court, Records 4639-2012 and 4646-2012. 
 
 87 
the Constitutional Court of Guatemala considered the results of a community referendum 
regarding a mining project as binding. The court’s ruling, which was premised on the 
ILO 169 and the Municipal Code, stated “the right of peoples to be consulted is 
unquestionable35.”  
Nonetheless, the Escobal mine commences commercial production and the anti-
mining movement in southeastern Guatemala faced extraordinary violence, repression 
and criminalization, both at the hands of the mine’s private security firm, as well as by 
state security forces. The anti-mining movement in San Rafael Las Flores suffered 
particularly heavy losses from the repressive measures of the state, and following the 
state of siege in 2013 most of the anti-mining movement has been organized from within 
the other municipalities in the movement. In June 2017, the anti-mining movement saw a 
revival when communities from the areas surrounding the mine established a blockade in 
Casillas along the main road to San Rafael Las Flores and the Escobal mine. With the 
blockade they were able to halt mine-related traffic and effectively shut down mining 
operations. Despite police efforts to break up the blockade, movement members were 
able to hold their ground – and continue to do so as we write this in spring 2019. Then in 
July 2017, Guatemala’s Supreme Court suspended the mine’s exploitation license, citing 
failure to comply with the ILO Convention169 by not consulting the indigenous Xinka 
people in the areas surrounding the mine, as well as article 66 of the constitution.36 In 
September 2018 the Constitutional Court then recognized the Xinka people’s right to 
                                                
35 “Es incuestionable el derecho de los pueblos a ser consultados.”   
 
 
36 Constitutional Court, Resolución 4785-2017.   
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consultation, reaffirming the suspension of the mining license, until the MEM carries out 
a ‘free and informed’ consultation, as established by the ILO 16937. 
The case of the anti-mining movement in southeastern Guatemala is important for 
several reasons. The Mataquescuintla municipal consultation was the first community 
consultation to be found legally binding, establishing a jurisprudence that acknowledges 
the peoples unquestionable right to consultation. The Court’s decisions also establish that 
community consultations are – in the Court’s eyes – an important mechanism for political 
participation and deliberation through which affected communities can make their 
opinions heard. The case further reifies that indigenous peoples right to prior consultation 
cannot be ignored. The anti-mining movement in southeastern Guatemala is also unique 
in the ways it created new forms of political actions and mobilization that cross ethnic 
and cultural lines, as well as the ways in which different groups and organizations 
worked through and with the COCODEs and the COMUDEs in the organization of 
consultations.  
5. Conclusion: The contested terrain of environmental governance and hybrid 
mechanisms for participation  
Throughout this paper we have examined the growing importance of law, legal 
institutions and legal actors in anti-mining struggles, analyzing both why and how 
environmental activists mobilize through ‘legal’ forms of political action. We argue that 
people affected by mining related environmental injustices resist their exclusion from 
                                                
37 Constitutional Court, Expediente 4785-2018. For the complete court documents see: 
https://cc.gob.gt/2018/09/04/resolucion-4785-2017-caso-minera-san-rafael/ 
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environmental decision-making by creating ‘hybrid mechanisms for participation’, such 
as community consultations, and by challenging dominant notions of ‘participation’ 
through their contestation of EIAs and technocratic, market-driven ideas about FPIC. 
Changing legal opportunity structures, growing rights consciousness and the 
codification of collective indigenous rights have shaped the ways in which environmental 
activists develop innovative ‘legal’ strategies, which they use to pry open political spaces 
they have historically been excluded from. Changing legal opportunity structures in 
Guatemala are shaped by legislative and political changes related to post-war 
democratization, as well as the reshaping of the relationships between state, market and 
citizens, which stem from economic liberalization that favors a minimalist state. Two 
important processes explaining changing legal opportunity structures are the transferal of 
environmental governance responsibilities, such as the undertaking of environmental 
impact assessment and facilitation of public participation, from the state to the private 
sector, as well as the transferal of responsibilities relating to citizen participation in local 
decision-making processers from central to ‘lower’ administrative levels. Post-war 
political and legislative changes also included the increasing codification of the collective 
rights of indigenous peoples, affording indigenous peoples some enforceable rights. Of 
particular importance is the ratification of the ILO Convention 169, which is binding to 
its signatories and states the right of indigenous peoples to prior consultation on 
development projects affecting their livelihoods. However, the failure of the 1999 
‘Consulta Popular’ denied indigenous communities their right to ‘customary law’. 
Tensions between conflicting and contradictory ideas about citizen participation, and 
laws that, on one hand, leave the private sector with the responsibility of EIAs and public 
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participation and, on the other hand, laws that acknowledge communities’ right to 
participation, as well as indigenous peoples’ right to prior consultation, shape the 
contested terrain of environmental governance. Environmental activists maneuver the 
constraints and possibilities of these changing legal opportunity structures, drawing in 
novel ways on changing legal and regulatory frameworks, such as the decentralization 
legislation and the ILO 169, to influence environmental governance and to gain access to 
decision making arenas.  
In analyzing the evolving political actions of anti-mining movements, we find that 
environmental activists challenge dominant notions of ‘participation’ through their 
contestations of technocratic EIAs and market-driven ideas about FPIC. They do so to 
obtain recognition and to assert the rights of affected communities to self-determination 
in environmental decision-making processes, and to unsettle the legitimacy of dominant 
ideas about development and human-environment relations. One of the most powerful 
ways in which environmental activists are able to challenge their exclusion from 
environmental decision-making arenas is by generating grassroots driven forms of 
governance practices, such as community referendums, which have become one of the 
most common tools for resisting mining development in Guatemala. Walter and Urkidi 
(2017, p. 276) argue that community consultations are a political tool and a hybrid 
mechanism of participation. Consultations are both a strategic tool of social movements 
and an emergent (and contested) participation institution: “Las consultas deben verse solo 
desde la perspectiva juridical, sino también desde la politíca.”  
Many scholars are skeptical about the idea that rights based, and participatory 
discourses can contribute to transformative politics and environmental justice. Charles 
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Hale has criticized the multicultural policy model as a project of  “neo-liberal 
multiculturalism,” which recognizes certain aspects of cultural difference while 
advancing economic policies that contradict indigenous rights to autonomy in practice 
(Hale, 2002, 2005). Others view ‘state-sponsored multiculturalism’ (Postero, 2007, p. 13) 
as a mechanism for the reconstitution of hegemony and legitimacy of weak states and 
fragile democracies, rather than signifying a genuine government commitment to 
guarantee indigenous rights (Sieder, 2007, 2011). More recently, powerful critiques of 
participatory processes such as ‘Free, Prior and Informed Consent’ have emerged as 
scholars suggest that FPIC is increasingly used as a mechanism to facilitate and 
legitimate development projects, undermining indigenous autonomy (Dunlap, 2018a; 
Temper, 2019). The question of whether rights can contribute to the realization of 
progressive social transformations is not a new one (Hunt, 1990; Scheingold, 1974). Yet, 
as Alan Hunt (1990, p. 325) argues, rights take shape and are constituted by and through 
struggle. Thus, rights have the capacity to be elements of emancipation, but are neither a 
perfect nor exclusive vehicle for emancipation.  
The mobilization of rights can render injustices legible in the idioms of law and 
popular legal consciousness (Delaney, 2016; NeJaime, 2011). “Rights that matter are 
rights that matter” – substantive enforceable claims such as rights to affordable secure 
shelter; rights to dignified employment, rights to a healthy environment, and so on. That 
is, rights that impose enforceable obligations on others and substantively reconfigure the 
relevant fields of power. These are also rights that under the prevailing conditions across 
the world are ‘no-rights.’ In the words of David Delaney (2016, p. 271): “It’s not 
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unreasonable to ask, as many have, whether ‘rights’ are the right means to justice. And 
it’s reasonable to respond: what else you got?” 
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Chapter five:  Corporate-community conflicts in Guatemala: Exploring private 
sector perspectives on opposition to mining 
1. Introduction 
In their review of corporate-community conflicts around mining projects, Conde 
and Le Billon (2017, p. 693) identify three important gaps in the literature: first, ‘the 
internal perspectives of government authorities and mining companies on resistance; 
second, the increasing criminalization of dissent by the state and the repression of 
resistance by mining companies; and third, there is a need to deepen the knowledge of the 
‘micro-politics and psychological dimensions of conflict escalation’ in places where there 
are ongoing anti-mining struggles. In this paper I wish to address the first of these gaps 
by exploring the perspectives of the Guatemalan private sector on corporate-community 
conflicts surrounding opposition to extractive industries. My aim is to contribute to 
ongoing discussions, advanced by authors like Aguilar-Støen and Bull (Aguilar-Støen & 
Bull, 2016; Bull & Aguilar-Støen, 2015, 2016a, 2019), about the ways in which elites and 
industry actors shape environmental governance.  
Mining conflicts have proliferated throughout Guatemala since the early 2000s, 
when the current cycle of mining conflicts started to emerge in response to the 
construction of the Marlin mine in the Department of San Marcos. Much of community 
opposition to mining revolves around a range of interrelated concerns, including the
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unjust burden of environmental degradation, the risk to rural and land-based livelihoods, 
cultural survival, the rights to lands and territories, and claims to political autonomy.  
Guatemala’s mining sector is characterized by a lack of transparency and 
communities affected by mining development have historically been excluded from 
environmental decision-making processes. The private sector and government have by 
and large dismissed concerns voiced by affected communities and their claims for 
participation and recognition. Then, as communities started to organize and engage in 
collective action aimed at demanding their inclusion in environmental decision-making, 
the government and the private sector responded with criminalization, the escalation of 
force, and violent repression of anti-mining movements. As a result, levels of mining 
conflicts are extremely high in Guatemala with intense societal polarization and hostility 
between pro-mining and anti-mining groups.  
In recent years, scholarly attention has primarily focused on ‘community-level’ 
responses to extractive projects, increasingly conceptualized as ‘political reactions from 
below’ (Li, 2011; Borras & Franco, 2013; Hall et al., 2015). There is a robust literature 
that examines how people in Guatemala have reacted - ‘from below’ - to the spread of 
extractive projects throughout rural areas in the country (Pedersen, 2013, 2014; Urkidi, 
2011; 2017; Fox, 2015; Aguilar-Støen & Hirsch, 2015, 2017). However, less attention 
has been afforded to better understanding how political reactions ‘from above’ emerge 
and take shape in these contexts38. Governments, corporations and elites shape decisions, 
                                                
38 There is an emerging literature on mobilization against resource extraction that is dedicated to 
better understanding how political reactions ‘from above’ emerge and take shape (Cf. Brock & 
Dunlap, 2018; Dunlap 2018b; Geenen & Verweijen, 2017). This literature attempts to understand 
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practices and interactions that influence political actions ‘from above’ in environmental 
conflicts (Sveinsdóttir, Aguilar-Støen and Bull, forthcoming). Yet, there is little research 
that examines the actual perspectives of these actors on conflicts and opposition to 
mining. Elites and corporate actors tend to be ‘blackboxed’ - assumed, acknowledged, 
but rarely approached head on. Elsewhere Aguilar-Støen, Bull and I have examined the 
dialectic of political actions ‘from above’ and ‘from below’ in environmental conflicts by 
analyzing the complex configuration of corporate-government-elite networks and how 
these networks operate in response to anti-mining mobilizations (Sveinsdóttir et al., 
forthcoming). In this paper I wish to further substantiate the work on political actions 
‘from above’ and ‘from below’ by examining the discourses of business leaders and 
economic elites to analyze how the private sector explains and understands mining 
conflicts in Guatemala. 
The analysis presented in this paper draws on interviews and participant 
observation conducted in 2016 and 2017 with corporate representatives and business 
leaders, groups and associations that promote private sector interests, as well as the 
traditional economic elite, which I will collectively refer to as ‘the private sector’ 
throughout the paper. I analyze discourses emerging from interviews with these actors, in 
which they discussed their thoughts on socio-environmental conflicts and what they see 
as the main challenges currently facing the extractive sector in Guatemala. Bull and 
Aguilar-Støen (2019) argue that in order to study elite behavior, it is not enough to only 
study rational calculations. Rather, we must also study ideas and ideologies that justify 
                                                                                                                                            




and mobilize joint elite actions. They suggest that we study business discourses to 
analyze how business groups explain and understand the country’s development and how 
they articulate their own role in such development. I believe that this may also be applied 
to studying how the private sector explains and understands mining conflicts. In focusing 
on private sector discourses my hope is to advance a better understanding of how 
responses to mining opposition emerge and take shape, and the ways in which such 
discourses contribute to establishing the conditions of possibility of political action.  
In what follows I will start by discussing some methodological considerations 
about interviewing elites and ‘studying up.’ In this section I will expand on the fieldwork 
and ‘data collection’ that inform the analysis in this paper. Following the methodological 
discussion, I will offer some theoretical considerations on how I conceptualize elite 
dynamics, why understanding elite discourse matters, and how these are connected and 
matter in the context of corporate-community mining conflicts. The fourth section of the 
paper delves into the interviews and explores what the private sector sees as some of the 
main concerns currently facing extractive industries in the country. The fifth section 
discusses the analysis of the key discourses used by the private sector to explain 
corporate-community conflicts. Finally, the conclusion is presented.  
2. Methodological considerations on interviewing elite actors and ‘studying up’  
Increasingly scholars have turned their attention towards the role of elites within 
society, which in turn has led to an emerging literature on some of the methodological 
challenges of interviewing elites (Harvey, 2010). In researching the multitude of 
processes that shape contemporary landscapes of power, it is important to know more 
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about, and critically engage with, the people who are most influential in shaping these 
processes, along with those affected by them. Often these people of influence occupy 
privileged positions in social, economic and political networks and can influence – 
formally or informally – decisions and practices with key political, economic, social and 
environmental implications (Bull, 2015). Their status means they are often viewed as 
belonging to ‘elite’ groups. Although definitions of elites are problematic, and their 
precise roles in transforming geographies of power are complex, it is nonetheless clear 
that powerful groups of people in influential institutions and organizations are often key 
actors in studies that aim to engage critically with the changing character of social, 
economic and political worlds (Hughes & Cormode, 1998).  
Reflections on research practices of interviewing elites have focused on issues of 
power, positionality, and reflexivity within the research process (Dunn, 2007; McDowell, 
1998). While these are issues present in all qualitative research, the challenges of 
‘studying up’ are viewed somewhat differently than other types of research, with key 
themes including issues of access, the dynamics of the interview itself, and the ability to 
control the results of the research (Oglesby, 2010). Researchers also find themselves 
having to make sense of the numerous friendly encounters – moments marked by 
generosity, empathy, or affinity – that disrupts notions of critical distance (Thiem & 
Robertson, 2010). Alienation is another concern, as researchers who move amongst 
purported adversaries experience risk of being misunderstood by those they frame as 
allies (Jansson, 2010). Such stresses accumulate over time, leading Oglesby (2010) to 
question the long-term sustainability of any given inquiry. All of these issues challenge 
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the notion that it might be less problematic for researchers to critique the powerful than to 
produce research on the comparatively ‘powerless’ (Hughes & Cormode, 1998). 
2.1. Gaining access and interview dynamics 
Issues of access to elite participants are a reoccurring theme throughout the 
literature on interviewing elites (Harvey, 2010; Herod, 1999; McDowell, 1998; Mikecz, 
2012; Rice, 2010). One of the main challenges associated with gaining access to and 
interviewing elites revolves around the unequal power relations that lie in wait for 
researchers (Rice, 2010). Whereas in non-elite studies the researchers have the position of 
“experts,” in elite studies those who are being studied are “in the know.” Indeed, one of 
the reasons that elites are “relatively understudied” is because of their power and ability 
to protect themselves from intrusion and criticism (Mikecz, 2012). Gaining access to 
elites has to be carefully negotiated, which can be time consuming and costly, and most 
elites purposefully erect barriers that set them apart from society (Laurila, 1997; Shenton 
& Hayter, 2004; Welch, Marschan-Piekkari, Penttinen, & Tahvanainen, 2002).  
Elite interviews are very difficult, if not virtually impossible, to repeat, so careful 
planning is essential. The researcher must negotiate access before the interview and often 
has to go through large numbers of gatekeepers to get access to the elites. Yeung (1995) 
suggest that researchers should attempt to use as many different avenues as possible in a 
polite, yet persistent and opportunistic manner when trying to gain access to elite 
participants. Herod (1999) stresses the usefulness of “gate-keepers” and discusses that 
being able to use someone’s name or having a letter of introduction, and/or their business 
card has given him access to high-level officials in other organizations who might 
otherwise have ignored his requests for help. This shows that networking is important, 
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since it can help establish a degree of credibility in the eyes of potential interviewees and 
provides ready answers to the question “how did you get my name?” (p. 316).  
McDowell said that the success of gaining access to elites depends a great deal on 
serendipity, social networks as well as particular circumstances (1998, p. 2135). Oglesby 
(2010), on the other hand, was surprised by the ease with which she gained access to 
sugar industry elites in Guatemala. She speculates that sharing a racial and class 
background with mill owners and managers gained her a level of acceptance. Oglesby 
also felt that gaining access was sometimes made easier by being a woman; she was 
probably not perceived as much of a threat and was perhaps able to be more disarming in 
an interview than a man.  
2.2. Research and fieldwork in Guatemala  
In my own research, gaining access to elite participants was not without issues. 
Guatemala’s private sector and business elites are very elusive and given the critical 
spotlight under which extractive industries find themselves, elites and corporate actors 
are very guarded. However, through several good initial gatekeepers I was able to get the 
ball rolling and during fieldwork in 2016 and 2017 I was able to conduct eighteen in-
depth interviews with business leaders and elites connected to the Guatemalan extractive 
sector. The people I interviewed included CEO’s of mining companies, transnational 
conglomerates, and agro-industrial organizations, the presidents of the Industrial 
Chamber of Guatemala, the Extractive Industries Business Association (GREMIEXT), 
and other umbrella organizations promoting private sector interests. I also interviewed the 
leaders of industry-led environmental non-profit organizations, as well as past- and 
present public servants responsible for state-led conflict resolution in mining conflicts. I 
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also interviewed several members of the traditional Guatemalan economic elite. My 
fieldwork also included visits to two different large-scale mining projects: a mineral mine 
in the Department of San Marcos, and a cement plant in the Department of Guatemala. 
While the mine in San Marcos is now closed and undergoing reclamation, both projects 
experienced strong opposition, having seen violent clashes, repression and 
criminalization. 
My research experience echoes McDowell’s (1998, p. 2135) when she says that a 
great deal depends on luck and chance, connections and networks, and the particular 
circumstances at the time, as well as a polite, yet persistent and opportunistic manner 
when trying to gain access to elite participants. I also strongly relate to the issues raised 
by Thiem and Robertson (2010) about having to make sense of the numerous friendly 
encounters – moments marked by generosity, empathy, or affinity – that disrupt notions 
of critical distance. Many of my interviewees challenged my preconceptions about them. 
I also struggled with emotions about moving among these purported adversaries, while 
also having strong affinities to the anti-mining movements, perceiving of myself as an 
ally to those very movements. Not only did I worry about alienating myself from my 
environmental activist friends, I also came to realize that moving between these two 
groups could jeopardize the safety of my activist friends. I do not intend for this to be a 
paper on methodological reflections. However, given the nature of the ‘data collection 
methods’ and the context within which they took place it becomes difficult to separate the 
emotional from the empirical and from the analytical – not that I believe that such a 
separation can ever really take place.  
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3. Conceptualizing elite dynamics and environmental governance in Guatemala   
The Guatemalan private sector and business elite remain relatively understudied, 
particularly in the context of environmental governance and extractive conflicts. Elites 
and corporate actors often feature on the periphery of studies on environmental conflicts 
in Guatemala, but then usually as the monolithic perpetrator: the capital owners, the 
business and knowledge elites, and the groups controlling the state, thereby contributing 
to the marginalization of rural peoples and the overexploitation and degradation of 
natural resources (Carruthers, 2008). However, elites are rarely the object of direct 
scrutiny in these studies. There are many reasons for this, the most obvious being the 
issue of access discussed in the previous section. One may also speculate that in some 
instances researchers who align themselves with the causes of marginalized social groups 
see elites and corporations as enemies and, as such, shy away from engaging directly with 
them. Nevertheless, in recent years both domestic and foreign scholars have increasingly 
studied the country’s elite39. 
Much of the traditional literature on elites comes from development theory, 
focusing particularly on the role elites play in economic growth, industrial upgrading and 
institutional change40. However, as Bull and Aguilar-Støen (2015, 2016) point out, much 
less attention has been afforded to understanding the complex constellations of elite 
                                                
39 See e.g. Aguilar-Støen, 2015; Aguilar-Støen and Bull, 2016; Bull, 2005, 2014, 2015; Bull & 









dynamics and environmental governance.41 While the traditional literature on elites has 
mostly been uninterested in environmental governance, the more critical literature on 
environmental governance has rarely included elites as the object of direct scrutiny (Bull 
& Aguilar-Støen, 2016, p. 142). Through their work on elite dynamics and environmental 
governance in Latin America, scholars Aguilar-Støen and Bull (Aguilar-Støen & Bull, 
2016; Bull & Aguilar-Støen, 2015, 2016b) have started to bridge this gap in the literature.  
Bull and Aguilar-Støen (2016) provide new insights into the ways in which elites 
exert influence over decisions and practices with environmental implications. They 
examine elite shifts throughout Latin America, noting how new elites have emerged, how 
old elites continue to influence politics and the economy, and how the relationship 
between new and old elites has affected environmental governance. Their findings 
illustrate and confirm some of the main problems discussed in the elite literature: how 
entrenched elites have hindered structural transformations towards an environmental 
governance that ensures more sustainable and equitable development; the conflicts over 
land use and how they have their roots in institutions that are kept weak due to historical 
control by elites; and how new governments accommodate their politics to the demands 
of the elites (Bull and Aguilar-Støen, 2016b). In the specific context of Guatemala, 
Aguilar-Støen and Bull (2016a) have also analyzed the role of the elite as partners, 
intermediaries and beneficiaries of the country’s mining sector. Their analysis examines 
the linkages between different elites and illustrates how alliances created between the 
elite, the military, and the government engender violence in reaction to anti-mining 
                                                
41 There are some exceptions noted by Bull and Aguilar-Støen (2015, p. 6), e.g., in studies dealing 
with international trade regimes or international environmental treaties (see Cashore, 2002; Levy 
and Newell, 2002, 2005; McCarthy, 2004) 
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mobilizations. Sveinsdóttir, Aguilar-Støen and Bull (forthcoming) further expand on this 
by analyzing how corporate-government-elite networks in Guatemala mobilize in their 
response to anti-mining resistance. Here the authors focus on the interplay between 
corporate/state mobilization on the one hand, and anti-mining mobilization on the other, 
analyzing how they mutually shape each other.  
A main finding advanced by Aguilar-Støen, Bull and Sveinsdóttir is that elites 
and elite dynamics impact, in a multitude of ways, practices, decisions, and interactions 
that shape how the environment and natural resources are governed. Elites can both 
strengthen and undermine institutions and situated practices, whether it be through rent 
seeking behavior like lobbying for the lowering of mining royalties, influencing whose 
voices get included in public participation and environmental decision-making processes, 
or demanding the escalation of enforcement to protect projects experiencing community-
level opposition. 
3.1. Who are the elite in Guatemala?    
In Guatemala, business elites are major political actors, through informal 
groupings, business associations, think tanks and politcal parties. The disctinction 
between their private roles as business leaders and public roles as political advocates is 
often blurred, and business leaders not only act individually but also form parts of 
powerful families and business groups. Most of the social science literature 
conceptualizes them as collectives such as ‘oligrachies’, ‘elite families’, ‘power groups’ 
or ‘hegemonic blocks’. However, Bull and Aguilar-Støen prefer to use the term ‘business 
elites’, but also refer to the organised business elite as ‘private sector’ as this concept is 
most used in the public debate, and also by business leaders themselves.   (Bull & 
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Aguilar-Støen, 2019, p. 122). Guatemala’s business elites and private sector are 
organized within a peak business association, the Comité de Asociaciones Agricolas, 
Comerciales, Industriales y Financieras (CACIF), which is the most important economic 
entity in Guatemala and a powerful political force. Mining companies are then organized 
in the Extractive Industries Business Association (Gremiext), which belongs to the 
Industrial Chamber of Guatemala and which forms part of CACIF. (Aguilar-Støen, 2015; 
Schneider, 2012). 
Guatemala is characterized by the dominance of entrenched elite networks that 
have controlled the country’s means of production (land, labor, commercial institutions, 
banks and industries) and political system since the colony to the present day (Casaús 
Arzú, 2010; Dosal,1995). However, political changes stemming from post-war 
democratization and economic restructuring in the 1980s and 1990s have led to shifting 
elite dynamics and the emergence of new elites and new factions within the traditional 
elite (Aguilar-Støen & Bull, 2016; Bull & Aguilar-Støen, 2016a; Sveinsdóttir et al., 
forthcoming). Bull and Aguilar-Støen (2019, p. 134) argue that these shifts must be 
understood in the context of three inter-related processes. First, economic changes have 
transformed the international and domestic context within which Guatemalan business 
groups operate, with new transnational competitors who often control access to markets 
and technology entering the fray. Nonetheless, the traditional business elite remained 
powerful and adapted to global economic changes by forming alliances with transnational 
corporations and by expanding globally and regionally (Bull et al., 2014). With regard to 
the extractive industries new transnational actors are dependent on the domestic business 
elite, who control important political resources, networks and information without which 
 105 
international actors could not operate. As a result the Guatemalan private sector has been 
successful in keeping transnational corporations in subordinate positions (Bull et al., 
2014; Schneider, 2012). Second, new business sectors have emerged related to the 
privatized state enterprises, non-traditional exports, tourism, the media as well as illegal 
and criminal networks. The emergence of these new actors who challenge the dominance 
of the traditional elite has resulted in new forms of competition over the control of the 
state, e.g., through campaign financing. While in the past the traditional elite (CACIF) 
financed electoral campaigns in Guatemala, currently it is estimated that the traditional 
private sector provides ca. 25 percent of funding, emerging groups contribute 50 percent 
of the funding and the rest is estimated to come from criminal groups, mainly drug 
traffickers (CICIG, 2015). Third, elite control over the state apparatus has been 
challenged by the ascent of non-elites to power. In Guatemala reforms and demands from 
non-elite groups have contributed to transformations, particularly in the justice sector, 
where the traditional elite has lost control (Bull & Aguilar-Støen, 2019). However, 
despite these shifting elite constellations, Guatemala remains characterized by an 
extremely elite dominated system, which is also characterized by institutional corruption 
and exclusion. Any analysis of corporate-community conflicts, elite dynamics and 
environmental governance in Guatemala must be understood against this backdrop.  
3.2. Studying discourses to analyze private sector perspectives and behaviors 
Bull and Aguilar-Støen (2019) argue that in order to study elite behavior, it is not 
enough to only focus on rational calculations. Rather, we must also study ideas and 
ideologies that justify and mobilize collective elite action. They suggest we study private 
sector discourse to analyze how business groups explain and understand development and 
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how they articulate their own role in such development. I believe that this may also be 
applied to studying how the private sector explains and understands mining conflicts. I 
follow Bull and Aguilar-Støen’s understanding of discourse as “structures of signification 
that allow us to understand the world and give it meaning.” (2019, p. 123). Discourses are 
relational and contested fields of power. They are the products of power struggles 
through which we naturalize and internalize hegemonic interpretations, but discourses 
also where these interpretations are contested and resisted (Dunn and Neumann, 2016). 
Discourses represent a cognitive unity that contributes to forming identities. Discourse 
theory suggests that the ways in which something is communicated does not necessarily 
represent reality in a neutral manner, but can create, change and reconfigure reality 
(Philips & Jørgensen, 2002). This is not to suggest that reality does not exist beyond the 
discursive, rather, as Laclau and Mouffe (2001, p. 108) explain:  
“An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in the sense 
that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But whether their specificity as 
objects is constructed in terms of ‘natural phenomena’ or ‘expressions of the wrath of 
God’, depends upon the structuring of a discursive field.” 
Which discourses become dominant and hegemonic depends on the access that 
different actors have to resources and power so that discourses can be comprehended 
within a cultural and historical context. This power includes the access that different 
actors may have to the means through which narratives and discourses are distributed. 
Discourses do not necessarily reflect cause-effect relationships but if they create an 
apparent consistency of ideas they can prevail. Discourses contribute to establishing 
‘common sense’ (in the Gramscian sense) at given points in time inasmuch as a discourse 
is accepted as a frame of reference without major dispute and, as such, discourses 
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contribute to establishing conditions of possibility (Bull & Aguilar-Støen, 2019, pp. 123-
124). In focusing on private sector discourses my hope is to advance a better 
understanding of how responses to mining opposition emerge and take shape, and the 
ways in which such discourses contribute to establishing the conditions of possibility of 
political action. 
4. Private sector discourses on corporate-community conflicts and opposition to 
mining  
 This paper sets out to explore and analyze the perspectives of Guatemala’s private 
sector on corporate-community conflicts and opposition to extractive industries. In 
interviews with the economic elite and business leaders, interviewees were asked about 
their thoughts on opposition to extractive projects; what they understand as the 
explanations for the emergence of said opposition, as well as their understanding of 
environmental conflicts more broadly. The following section analyzes the private sector’s 
discourse on what they see as some of the main concerns currently facing extractive 
industries in the country: the absence of the state from rural areas where mining activities 
generally take place; the presence of NGOs and ‘third-party actors’ with vested interests; 
the lack of legal certainty and insecurity surrounding investments; and the lack of 
domestic regulation of the ILO Convention 169. 
The people interviewed, and whose narratives are examined in the following 
sections, included the CEO’s of transnational mining companies, multinational 
conglomerates involved in hydropower development, and a leading agro-industrial 
organization in the sugar industry. I also interviewed leaders of business associations and 
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industrial business networks, as well as board members of umbrella organizations 
promoting private sector interests, some of which belong to the traditional Guatemalan 
economic elite. I interviewed past- and present public officials who had led institutional 
instrument responsible for state-led conflict resolution in mining conflicts, as well as held 
roles as private secretary to a president and been members of the Peace Commission 
(COPAZ).  
4.1. The absence of the state 
A key discourse emerging from the interviews was that of state’s role in socio-
environmental conflicts throughout the country. There is a perceived ‘absence of the 
state’ from rural areas and an understanding that this absence affects governance and 
opposition against extractive industries:  
“Entonces lo que tu ves sobre todo en el interior del país en esos territorios indígenas 
es una variable y una dimensión que es verdaderamente la causa de mucha de la 
problemática de la ingobernabilidad y es la ausencia del Estado.”  (Interview #9) 
“…so what you see, above all in the interior of the country in these indigenous 
territories is a variable [sic] and a dimension that is the true cause of the problem of 
lack of governability and the absence of the State.” (Interview#9) 
 “Y mucha de la conflictividad creo que viene de esa debilidad del estado. Un estado 
muy débil, con instituciones débiles, inexistente en ciertas partes del país….” 
(Interview #1) 
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“…and much of the conflicts I believe come from that weakness from the state. A 
very weak state, with weak institutions, non-existent [institutions] in some parts of the 
country…” (Interview #1) 
Two main narratives emerged within the ‘absence of the state’ logic: first, that 
because of this absence, the state fails to provide basic services to the rural population. 
As a result, frustrated rural communities turn to the private sector and demand services, 
which causes grievances between corporations and communities when the private sector 
is unable or unwilling take on the role of the state as service provider:  
“Pero está muy complicado, porque también desde la lógica de las comunidades 
como el Estado no aparece, no da salud, no da educación, no hay nada, entonces 
muchas veces tienen una mentalidad extorsiva a la empresa le tengo que sacar todo lo 
que pueda, porque obviamente si viene aquí, tiene dinero, tenemos que aprovechar al 
máximo para sacar beneficios, entonces se da esa situación verdad.” (Interview #11) 
“But this is very complicated, because from the logic of the communities since the 
State does not show up, does not provide health, or education, there is nothing, then 
many times they [the communities] have an extortion mind set towards the Company, 
I have to extract as much as I can because obviously if they come here, they have 
money, we have to get the most out of it to access benefits.” (Interview #11) 
“Hay una conflictividad digamos natural, lógica, comprensible, absolutamente porque 
ante la ausencia del Estado sobre todo en las comunidades más lejanas de la ciudad 
capital digamos, evidentemente estas comunidades lo que quieren ver es en qué 
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momento llega a atenderlo, hambre, pobreza extrema, pobreza, falta de salud, falta de 
servicios de salud, falta de servicios de educación, una mala calidad de salud, o sea 
ante todos estos factores es lógico que ciertas comunidades sientan el deseo de 
manifestarse y dar un poco de conflictividad y esa creo que es entendible, es la que se 
tiene que atender y es la que también en algunos casos el sector privado sustituye al 
gobierno y genera oportunidades para minimizar estos conflictos, eso es 
comprensible.” (Interview #5) 
“There is a level of conflict that is let’s say, natural, logic, understandable, absolutely 
because in the face of the absence of the state, above all in faraway communities, 
evidently, these communities what they want is to see when they can access services, 
hunger, extreme poverty, poverty, lack of health, lack of health services, lack of 
education services, bad quality of health, so, in the face of all these factors it is logical 
that some communities feel the desire to manifest themselves and cause some 
conflict, and that I think is understandable, that is what we have to take care of, but in 
some cases it is the private sector taking the place of the government and that 
generates opportunities to minimize conflicts, that is understandable.” (Interview #5) 
The second narrative within the ‘absence of the state’ logic was that the 
grievances stemming from state absence create room for ‘third-party actors,’ such as 
environmental NGOs, to take advantage of community frustrations, manipulating 
communities,42 and pitting them against the private sector and the extractive industries: 
                                                
42 I use ‘communities’ because it is the term used both by the private sector and the anti-mining 
movements themselves. 
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“Porque prevalece la ausencia del Estado, ha hecho en las comunidades, prevalece 
aquello que ¿qué beneficio me van a dar a mí? Tiene que dejarme algo. Entonces la 
minería ha sido satanizada pero sobre todo desde fuera, muchos de estos remanentes 
del conflicto armado, de los que estuvieron en el verdad, reciben mucho 
financiamiento de fuera para el tema minero y la industria minera no fue 
precisamente la que mejor se pudo adaptar a las situaciones, de explicar y todo fue 
difícil entonces fue satanizada desde un inicio.” (Interview #12) 
“Because of the State absence, this has made that in the communities it prevails very 
much that [idea of] what is in it for me? They have to give me something. Then 
mining has been demonized, above all from outside, much of this is remnants from 
the armed conflict, from those who receive funding from foreigner actors for the 
mining theme and the mining industry has not been the one to adapt best to those 
situations, of explaining,   [they were unable to explain well] everything was difficult 
and it [mining] was demonized from the start.” (Interview #12) 
The private sector grievances regarding the absence of the state seem 
contradictory considering the private sector and the business elite have been the driving 
force behind the ‘rolling back of the state’ since the 1980s and the 1990s. One 
explanation might be that grievances reflect frustrations about a state and society that no 
longer corresponds solely to the interests of the business elite. The emergence of new 
elite factions, transnational competitors, as well as the traction gained by non-elite actors 
and civil society, has resulted in shifting power dynamics and changing opportunity 
structures within the state apparatus, which have meant that the traditional business elite 
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are no longer the sole power player in Guatemalan society (Bull & Aguilar-Støen, 2019). 
A business leader belonging to the traditional economic elite told me: “We believe that in 
Guatemala two countries exist, two Guatemalas, but we believe that the second 
Guatemala is the one we have made possible” “creemos que en Guatemala existen dos 
países, dos Guatemalas pero creemos que la segunda Guatemala es la que nosotros 
hemos hecho posible.” The first Guatemala being the poverty-stricken, underdeveloped 
Guatemala, the second one, the modern, affluent and business oriented Guatemala, and 
they – the private sector – are the ones who created it. ‘We made this country’ one could 
read between the lines. 
4.2. NGOs, leftist ideology and foreign manipulation 
“…las ONGs ambientalistas…pinches negociantes, sin vergüenza…” (Interview #6) 
“…environmental NGOs, fucking shameless business…” (Interview #6) 
A main concern of the private sector is the presence and influence of ‘third-party 
actors’ in lieu of state absence in rural areas. The private sector sees the presence of 
environmental NGOs and so called ‘third-party actors’ as one of the main drivers for 
conflict and opposition to extractive industries. The perception is that community 
opposition only emerges when ‘third-party actors’ with vested financial and political 
interests insert themselves into communities to turn them against the companies:  
“Generalmente cuando tú te sientas con las comunidades, cuando dialogas con ellos, 
cuando te pones de acuerdo las cosas funcionan bien, hasta que aparece un tercero en 
discordia, un tercero que en algún momento tiene sus propios intereses también.” 
(Interview #11) 
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“Generally if you sit down with the communities, when you dialogue with them, 
when you reach agreements, thing work well, it is until third parties appear, a third 
party who has its own interests too...” (Interview #11) 
There seem to be two discourses within the anti-NGO logic: first, the narrative 
that environmental NGOs manipulate communities for financial gain; and second, that 
foreign countries finance environmental NGOs because of leftist ideologies:   
“Entonces comenzaron, como te dije las ONGs salieron, algunas, otras pues ya que 
empezaron a conocer el negocio porque es un negocio miserable de verdad.” 
(Interview #6) 
“Then they started, as I told you, NGOs came forward, some of them, others well, 
when they started to understand the business, because it is a miserable business, 
truly…” (Interview #6) 
“…este tipo de movimientos pseudoambientalistas, que para mí son solo 
movimientos que se respaldan en el ambientalismo pero de lo que viven es de generar 
conflicto y que en Guatemala siempre exista conflicto patrocinados en algunos casos 
por algunos países del extranjero.” (Interview #5) 
“That type of pseudo environmental movement, to me they are using 
environmentalism as an excuse, but they come here to generate conflict and that in 
Guatemala there will always be a conflict sponsored sometimes by some foreign 
countries.” (Interview #5) 
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“…también creo que hay organizaciones de izquierda que se oponen por una razón 
ideológica, ahí es donde amarro eso con toda la historia del conflicto armado y que 
eso ayuda como efervescer esa conflictividad.” (Interview#3)    
“… I also believe that there are leftist organizations that are against [mining] only for 
ideological reasons, that is how I ling that with the history of the armed conflict and 
that it helps to fire up that level of conflict.” (Interview#3)    
There is a sentiment among some factions of the private sector that leftist 
countries manipulate environmental conflicts and fuel opposition against extractive 
industries because for ideological reasons. Those who hold to this view seem to view the 
Nordic countries, Sweden and Norway in particular, and the Netherlands as the main 
culprits. One interviewee encouraged me to be careful because my last name looks 
Swedish, and that the Swedes have done much harm to Guatemala – “nos han hecho 
mucho daño” – and as such other business leaders might be reluctant to meet with me. 
Anti-leftist discourse is of course not new in Guatemala and has its roots in the anti-
communist logic of the civil war. Furthermore, the Nordic countries and the Netherlands 
all played roles in post-war peace building efforts, some of which included their 
development agencies supporting civil society and capacity building of civil society 
organizations.  
In the context of this perceived manipulation by environmental NGOs and outside 
forces the private sector again voiced its discontent with the state for being either unable, 
or unwilling, to deal with these actors:  
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“Entonces primero tienen un tema de…pero esa parte no es tanto por falta de fuerza 
pública es más que todo por falta de certeza jurídica porque el mismo policía le da 
miedo trabajar, o sea ejecutar la orden porque cualquier cosa se va a la cárcel el 
policía. Si mata a un campesino en defensa propia el que se va al cárcel es el policía, 
entonces dices tu: qué onda cómo así? Entonces ese tipo de cosas son las que yo creo, 
esa línea gris porque se han fortalecido mucho la otra parte, la parte socialista que 
viene de…tu miras a aquí a los embajadores bueno de noruega ya se fue pero a los de 
Noruega, a los de Holanda y todos estos países europeos y ponen mucha presión para 
que el Estado no ejecute, para que no actúe.” (Interview #7) 
“Then first they (who?) have a theme about… but that part is not so much about lack 
of public force, it is more about lack of legal certainty because the very police is 
afraid of doing their work, that means of executing the orders because policemen are 
set in prison for whatever little reason. If they kill a peasant in self-defense the one 
who ends up in jail is the policeman, they you say, what? how?. Then that type of 
things are things that I believe, that gray line because the other side has been 
strengthened, the socialist part that comes from… you see here the ambassadors well 
the Norwegian one has left but you see them from Norway, from Holland and all 
those European countries putting a lot of press impeding the State to execute, so that 
it does not act” (Interview #7) 
The private sector’s strong feelings about environmental NGOs and ‘third-party 
actors’ must be understood against the backdrop of the civil war, the repercussions of 
which reverberate throughout Guatemalan society to this day. Activists are often 
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portrayed in similar ways as insurgents during the war, when the figure of the ‘internal 
enemy’ was central to normalizing counterinsurgency and genocide:  
“Entonces genera un tema ente la realidad del país, entre grupos de interés que 
nosotros creemos que viven de esto y que adicional hay un tema político detrás hay 
una guerra…que se firmó la paz…pero que nunca fue aceptada y que sigue haciendo 
ruido en la sociedad, y eso genera un nivel de conflictividad altísimo. Uno sigue 
viendo estos grupos de oposición que al final es hasta la victoria verdad, entonces hay 
un tema de problemas por ausencia del estado, de problemas socioeconómicos reales, 
de una realidad alterna que cuando se hace un proyecto llega uno a moverla y un tema 
político que incentiva todo esto y aprovecha todo esto y ese caldo es el que genera esa 
conflictividad.” (Interview #1) 
“Then in the face of the country’s reality a theme emerges, between interest groups 
we believe live of that and in addition there is a political theme, there is a war 
behind… peace was signed… but it was never accepted, and it still makes a lot of 
noise in society and that generates a very high level of conflict. One continues to see 
this opposition groups that at the end of the day is toward victory, right, then there is 
a theme related to problems caused by the absence of the State, real socioeconomic 
problems, of an alternative reality that when one launches a project you see it moving 
and a political theme that gives incentives to all this and that is the soup where 
conflict is cooking” (Interview #1) 
The linking of opposition to extractive industries to the rhetoric of the civil war, 
invoking the notion of the internal enemy, is used to justify violence and repression 
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against environmental activists and social movements. Such an understanding would 
indicate that the private sector, at least the more conservative hardliners, are less 
interested in resolving conflict through concessions and compromise, but instead opt for 
the explicit exclusion and marginalization of opposition (Sveinsdóttir et al., forthcoming).  
4.2. Lack of legal certainty and the state’s failure to protect investments  
Another main concern among the business elite is what they perceive as a ‘lack of 
legal certainty43’ in the judicial system. Judicial insecurity and the state’s failure to 
protect investments are seen as one of the greatest threats to the private sector and 
economic development in Guatemala:  
“en el sector minero e hidroeléctrico, parte de los retos que estamos viviendo es la 
falta de certeza jurídica, la falta de reglas claras y algunas decisiones de las cortes que 
únicamente que no generan ese tipo de certeza jurídica y estabilidad.” (Interview #5) 
“in the mining and hydroelectric sector, part of the challenges we are experiencing is 
the lack of legal certainty, the lack of clear rules and some court decisions that do not 
build that type of legal certainty and stability” (Interview #5) 
Since 2016, the Guatemalan courts have suspended the licenses of at least two 
mining projects and two hydropower projects for failure to properly consult affected 
communities prior to the installation of the projects (Sveinsdóttir & Aguilar-Støen, 
forthcoming). The courts based their decisions on the ILO Convention 169, which 
                                                
43 Interviewees would talk about ‘falta de certeza jurídica’ or the lack of legal certainty. In law, 
‘certeza del derecho’ (legal certainty) represents the requirement that decisions be made 
according to legal rules, i.e., be lawful. In short, legal security (‘seguridad jurídica’) is the legal 
certainty (‘certeza del derecho’) given to the individual by the State stating that their person, 
property and rights will not be violated. 
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Guatemala ratified in 1996 and is binding to its signatories, citing the infringement on the 
rights of indigenous peoples to prior consultation. This emerging jurisprudence has 
become a strong point of contention for the private sector that finds it particularly serious 
that licenses are being revoked when companies acted in ‘good faith,’ believing they had 
complied with regulatory and legal requirements set forth by the state: 
“Para nosotros es ofensivo que una licencia que está firme, que ya se vencieron todos 
los plazos para oposición, que existieron todos los plazos para oposición, el Estado 
venga y la revierta en función de acciones que el estado debió de haber hecho. Lo que 
están diciendo es que mire el ministro cuando dio su licencia no leyó el expediente y 
ahora que lo está leyendo dice que debe revocarlo, es tan serio como eso. Estamos 
muy preocupados por el futuro.” (Interview #1) 
“For us it is an offence that a licence that is firm, that has complied with all the 
deadlines for opposition, that all deadlines for opposition existed, the State comes and 
reverts it [the licence] due to actions that the State should have taken. What they 
[who?] are telling is listen minister when you granted the licence you did not read the 
application and now that you are reading it you say you will revoke it, it is as serious 
as that. We are very concerned for the future.” (Interview #1) 
“En este caso específico de la mina, el Estado…lo que dice el Estado, los tribunales 
es que el Estado no hizo la consulta por lo tanto revoca la licencia. Entonces el señor 
de esta mina es una víctima, o sea yo pedí una licencia y el estado me la dio y el 
Estado dice yo no hice lo que tenía que hacer y la revoco….entonces la posición es 
estoy de acuerdo revóquela, pero compense los daños por su falta de efectividad. 
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Entonces ese caso en específico es muy dañino para el Estado de Guatemala, dañino 
para el país que románticamente se ve como una victoria de grupos que en nuestra 
opinión, en mi opinión, no son representativos de las comunidades vecinas al 
proyecto si no que son representativas de grupos de oposición sistemática, esa es mi 
opinión sobre ese caso específico. Pero el daño no es específicamente a la mina el 
daño es el daño que le están haciendo al Estado de Guatemala y al tema de qué va a 
pasar en adelante. Un estado en donde no existe seguridad jurídica es un Estado en 
donde no se invierte. Ellos lograron su objetivo en que en este país nadie va a invertir 
y sin inversión lo que va a ver es pobreza y pobreza peor que la que tenemos.” 
(Interview #1) 
In the specific case of the mine, the State… what the State says, the courts is that the 
State did not conducted consultations therefore the license is revoked. Then the 
gentleman from that mine is a victim, I mean I applied for a license and the State gave 
it to me and then the State says I did not do what I had to do so I will revoke it… then 
the position is I agree revoke it but you need to compensate for the damage caused by 
your lack of efficiency. Then that specific case is very harmful for the Guatemalan 
State, harmful for the country that romantically sees it as a victory of groups that in 
our opinion, in my opinion do not represent neighboring communities they rather 
represent systematic opposition groups, that is my opinion on that specific case (what 
case?). But the harm is not specific to the mine, it is a harm done to the Guatemalan 
state and what is going to happen in the future. A Sate in which legal certainty does 
not exist is a State that does not attract investments. They [who?] reach their objective 
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that is nobody will invest in this country and without investments what we will have 
is poverty and a type of poverty that is worse than the one we have.” (Interview #1) 
Because of the recent suspensions of two major mining projects, El Tambor in 
2016 and El Escobal in 2017, many of the interviewees voiced concerns that mining is no 
longer a viable industry in Guatemala:  
 “Básicamente con el tema de la Puya, la minería está acabada porque nadie va a creer 
en una licencia de un Estado que las revoca  después que las otorgó, después que el 
proyecto está terminado. El problema es que me otorgan una licencia, me dejan 
terminar el proyecto y ahí revocan la licencia. Es un tema de seguridad jurídica 
terrible pero ese la realidad que estamos viviendo. Entonces la minería se va a 
acabar…” (Interview #1)  
“Basically with the theme of La Puya, mining is going to end because nobody will 
have faith in a lisence from a state that revokes the lisence after granting it, after the 
Project has ended. The problem is that they grant me a lisence, they let me finish the 
project and then they revoke the lisence. It is a terrible theme of legal certainty, but 
this is the reality we experience. Then mining is going to end…” (Interview #1) 
The discourse surrounding the lack of legal certainty must be understood in the 
context of how anti-mining movements are increasingly successful in mobilizing the law 
in their struggles. Much of what the private sector understands as judicial insecurity 
reflects the innovative ways environmental activists use legal strategies to challenge their 
exclusion from environmental decision-making arenas. They have done so by generating 
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grassroots driven forms of governance practices, such as community referendums, which 
Guatemalan courts have increasingly started to recognize as legally binding, a result of 
which have been the suspensions of mining and hydropower projects.   
4.3. The ILO Convention 169 and the principle of prior consultation 
Much of the contention surrounding legal uncertainty and the state’s failure to 
protect investments revolves around the ILO Convention 169, indigenous peoples right to 
prior consultation, and public participation in environmental decision-making processes 
more broadly. The private sector argues that Convention is being manipulated by 
environmental NGOs and again laments the states inability to do its job: 
“Y un tema que los une a los dos es el Convenio 169 de la OIT que lamentablemente 
por más de 20 años el Estado no lo ha sabido reglamentar y eso se ha vuelto un foco 
de conflictividad ahora porque por decisiones, a nuestro juicio, poco certeras de las 
cortes a veces por desconocimiento de algunos magistrados están cancelando. Y  ahí 
es donde no entendemos, ¿cómo la corte de Constitucionalidad cuando ya había 
dictaminado ahora determina totalmente lo contrario?, la Corte Suprema también. Y 
segundo partiendo que la responsabilidad de las consultas es una responsabilidad del 
Estado no de las empresas, el hecho de que no sea reglamentado no quiere decir que 
las consultas que se hagan haya que repetirlas y si hay que repetirlas ok, se repiten 
pero no cerrando las operaciones de las empresas.” (Interview #5) 
“And a theme that joins both [both what?] is the ILO 169 convention from the OIT 
that unfortunately the State has not known how to make rules and that has become a 
point of conflict because now, due to decision, in our judgment bad decisions from 
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the courts, sometimes due to lack of knowledge of some judges they are cancelling. 
And there is where we do not understand, how is it possible that the constitutional 
court once it has ruled in one direction now rules in the opposite direction? The 
supreme court as well. And second departing from the responsibility of the 
consultations it is a responsibility of the State not of the business, the fact that there 
are no rules does not mean that consultations that were conducted should be 
conducted again, if we have to do it again, that is ok but we do them again, the 
solution is not to cancel the operations of the projects.” (Interview #5) 
“El Convenio en los últimos cinco años ha sido utilizado digamos básicamente por 
grupos, porque no son las poblaciones per se si no son los defensores o los llamados 
defensores de los pueblos indígenas quienes han utilizada esto como una plataforma 
legal en oposición a minerías, hidroeléctricas, el caso de la palma africana no lo 
pueden hacer porque no son inversiones promovidas por el Estado digamos, son 
inversiones privadas cien por ciento o como el azúcar por ejemplo pero cuando hay 
de por medio una medida a nivel del Estado entonces es obligatorio hacer esos 
procesos de consulta, entonces eso ha creado muchísimos problema, ha creado 
muchísimo desgaste y hoy diría yo que estamos empantanados con ese tipo de cosas. 
Así que ese es otro gran reto, pensando en cómo se va  a poder implementar el 
Convenio 169 a futuro y que ese realmente se convierta en un convenio de beneficio 
para las poblaciones. Que atraiga inversión, que atraiga desarrollo, que sin molestar la 
cultura, sin asimilar a las poblaciones pero que de alguna manera ellos sean sujetos de 
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derechos humanos como el resto pero también del progreso, así que ese te diría yo 
que es otro gran reto que tenemos como sector.” (Interview #11) 
The convention has been used for the last five years basically by groups, because it is 
not the populations per se but the defenders or so-called defenders of indigenous 
peoples who have used this as a legal platform to oppose mining, hydroelectric, the 
case of African Palm they cannot do it because these are not investments promoted by 
the State let’s say,, they are private investments one hundred per cent or like 
sugarcane for example but when there is an internation on the State level then it is 
mandatory to conduct the consultations, then this has caused a lot of problems, this 
has created a lot of worn out y today I would say that we are mudded with that type of 
things. So this is a huge challenge, thinking about how to implement the Convention 
169 in the future and that it becomes a convention that will benefit the populations. 
That attracts investments, that attracts development without disturbing culture, 
without assimilating populations, but that in a way they become human rights 
subjects as everybody else but also of progress, so I would say to you that this is 
another huge challenge we have as a sector.” (Interview #11)   
The emerging jurisprudence in Guatemala, which acknowledges the right of 
indigenous peoples to prior consultation, is vehemently contested by the private sector, 
which argues that the Convention is not being applied correctly and needs to be 
regulated. ‘Prior consultation’ remains an unsettled and contested legal concept and there 
is no agreement about how the principle of prior consultation should be upheld in 
practice. However, the Constitutional Court has also declared that lack of internal 
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legislation on the ILO Convention and the principle of prior consultation “cannot lead to 
this right being nullified44.” Furthermore, indigenous movements in Guatemala have 
clearly stated that the fundamental issue at hand, from their perspective, is not the 
realization of prior consultation or their regulation. Rather, the issue is that the state must 
respect the political autonomy of indigenous people to carry out referendums through 
their own procedures, with cultural relevance and in the language spoken by the 
community, and without any type of coercion towards the community. As such, they 
argue, the state must respect the outcomes of the over 100 community referendums 
carried out in Guatemala so far (Xiloj, 2016) 
However, the private sector believes that the Convention is being manipulated by 
environmental NGOs and in July 2019, CACIF petitioned the ILO to intervene in 
Guatemala. CACIF and the private sector claim that recent unfavorable court rulings 
undermine legal certainty and infringe on the right to freedom enterprise and work, 
generating social conflict (Bolaños & Gramajo, 2017). The private sector has also denied 
the existence of indigenous peoples in areas affected by extractive projects in an attempt 
to negate the need for prior consultation as prescribed by the ILO Convention. In 2017, 
following the Court’s decision to suspend the licenses of the Escobal mine, the private 
sector made statements denying the existence of the Xinka people, either outright or in 
the areas surrounding the mine. The then president of CACIF was quoted saying that the 
Court’s resolution was based on a “non-existent community” and that the court’s findings 
were false (Prensa Libre, 2017). Following this the Court ruled that an anthropological 
study be undertaken in the area to determine whether the Xinka ‘really exist.’ In 
                                                
44 Constututional Court, Record 1408-2005. 
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September 2018, the Court ruled that there are indeed Xinka people in the areas 
surrounding the mine and that the Xinka people’s rights to prior consultation had been 
violated. As such the mine remains suspended, currently awaiting the results of whatever 
consultation takes place.   
The private sector is primarily concerned with who should be responsible for 
consultations. Currently, with respect to the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, it 
would seem that the state is responsible for facilitating prior consultations as prescribe by 
the ILO Convention 169. However, in 2013, the Constitutional Court recognized for the 
first time the results of a community-organized referendum on mining as binding, thus 
establishing a jurisprudence that acknowledges ‘the people’s right to be consulted’ and 
that the right to organize such referendums resides with municipalities and communities 
(Sveinsdóttir and Aguilar-Støen, forthcoming).  
5. Discussion 
Bull and Aguilar-Støen (2019) argue that to understand elite behavior we must 
study the ideas and ideologies that justify and mobilize joint elite actions. This following 
section presents a discussion of the key discourses of how the private sector explains and 
understands corporate-community conflicts surrounding mining.  
5.1. Absence of the state from rural areas 
A key discourse of the private sector surrounds the role of the state in mining 
conflicts and how the ‘absence of the state’ from rural areas affects corporate-community 
relationships. The discourses of the private sector and the business elite have most 
commonly considered development and economic growth to be dependent on roll back of 
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the state and the freeing of markets. However, as pointed out by Bull and Aguilar-Støen 
(2019), gradually, a stronger focus on institutions and social dialogue has evolved in the 
discourse of the elite. There are several factors that might explain this discursive shift: 
economic changes have transformed the domestic and international context in which 
Guatemalan business groups operate; and the emergence of new elite factions and 
transnational competitors, as well as the traction gained by non-elite actors and civil 
society, has resulted in shifting power dynamics and changing opportunity structures 
within the state apparatus, which have meant that the traditional business elite are no 
longer the sole power player in Guatemalan society. 
5.2. NGOs, third-party actors and foreign influence 
Another discourse of the private sector understands the presence of environmental 
NGOs and so called ‘third-party actors’ as a driving factor in corporate-community 
conflicts around mining. The private sector explains that community opposition stems 
from the interference of ‘third-party actors’ with vested financial and political interests, 
and who turn communities against the companies. Rural communities are often perceived 
of as lacking in agency and being malleable to outside manipulation. During the armed 
conflict, the conservative right-wing accused the rural population and indigenous people 
of being ‘engañados’ – fooled and manipulated – by outside forces (McAllister & Nelson, 
2013).  
There is a sentiment among some factions of the private sector that leftist 
countries manipulate environmental conflicts for ideological reasons. They view the 
Nordic countries, Sweden and Norway in particular, and the Netherlands as the main 
culprits. Anti-leftist discourse in Guatemala and has its roots in the anti-communist logic 
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of the civil war. The Nordic countries and the Netherlands all played roles in post-war 
peace building efforts, some of which included their development agencies supporting 
civil society and capacity building of civil society organizations.  
The private sector’s strong feelings about environmental NGOs and ‘third-party 
actors’ must be understood against the backdrop of the civil war, the repercussions of 
which reverberate throughout Guatemalan society to this day. Activists are often 
portrayed in similar ways as insurgents during the war, when the figure of the ‘internal 
enemy’ was central to normalizing counterinsurgency and genocide. The linking of anti-
mining movements to the rhetoric of the civil war, invoking the notion of the internal 
enemy, is used to justify violence and repression against environmental activists and 
social movements. Such an understanding would indicate that the private sector, at least 
the more conservative hardliners, are less interested in resolving conflict through 
concessions and compromise, but instead opt for the explicit exclusion and 
marginalization of opposition (Sveinsdóttir et al., forthcoming).  
5.3. Lack of legal certainty and the ILO Convention 169 
The discourse surrounding the lack of legal certainty must be understood in the 
context of how anti-mining movements are increasingly successful in mobilizing the law 
in their struggles. Much of what the private sector understands as judicial insecurity 
reflects the innovative ways environmental activists use legal strategies to challenge their 
exclusion from environmental decision-making arenas. They have done so by generating 
grassroots driven forms of governance practices, such as community referendums, which 
Guatemalan courts have increasingly started to recognize as legally binding, a result of 
which have been the suspensions of mining and hydropower projects.   
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Much of the discourse surrounding legal uncertainty and the state’s failure to 
protect investments surrounds the ILO Convention 169. The emerging jurisprudence in 
Guatemala, which acknowledges the right of indigenous peoples to prior consultation, is 
vehemently contested by the private sector, which argues that the Convention is being 
manipulated by environmental NGOs and needs to be regulated. However, more broadly, 
these discourses can be understood as relating to indigenous peoples right to prior 
consultation and who gets included in environmental decision-making processes.  
6. Conclusion 
This paper set out to explore the discourses of Guatemalan business leaders and 
economic elites to analyze how the private sector explains and understands corporate-
community mining conflicts in the country. In doing so, my aim is to contribute to 
ongoing discussions about how the private sector affects environmental governance and 
shapes the conditions of possibility of political action in environmental conflicts 
(Aguilar-Støen, 2015; Aguilar-Støen & Bull, 2016; Bull & Aguilar-Støen, 2015, 2016a, 
2019; Sveinsdóttir et al., forthcoming). Elites and corporations’ impact, in a multitude of 
ways, practices, decisions, and interactions that shape environmental governance. Elites 
can both strengthen and undermine institutions and situated practices, whether it be 
through rent seeking behavior like lobbying for the lowering of mining royalties, 
influencing whose voices get included in (or excluded from) public participation and 
environmental decision-making processes, or demanding the escalation of enforcement to 
protect projects experiencing opposition. In the past, entrenched elites have hindered 
structural transformations towards environmental governance that ensures more 
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sustainable and equitable development, and mining conflicts often have their roots in 
institutions that are kept weak due to historical control by elites (Bull and Aguilar-Støen, 
2016b).  
An analysis of how the private sector explains and understands corporate-
community mining conflicts reveales that the private sector is increasingly concerned 
about the role of the state, institutions and the law in environmental governance. The 
discourses around these concerns were articulated as the ‘absence of the state’ from rural 
areas; the lack of legal certainty and the state’s failure to protect investments; and the 
ILO Convention 169 and the principle of prior consultation. These concerns must be 
understood in the context of several interrelated processes. First, changing opportunity 
structures and shifting power dynamics have resulted in the emergence of new elite 
factions and transnational competitors, as well as considerable advances made by non-
elite actors and civil society, which means that the business elite are no longer the sole 
power player in competing for control of the state apparatus. Second, the discourse of 
‘lack of legal certainty’ reflects demands for more just environmental governance and 
anti-mining movements increasing success in mobilizing the law in their opposition to 
extractive industries. Third, the discourse on the ILO Convention 169 and its lack or 
regulation must be understood in the context of an emerging jurisprudence that 
acknowledges the right of indigenous peoples to prior consultation. Finally, the discourse 
of interference by environmental NGOs and ‘third-party actors’ has to be understood 
against the backdrop of the civil war and the ways in which its repercussions continue to 
reverberate throughout Guatemalan society. 
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However, more broadly, these discourses can be understood as a reflection of 
struggles over who gets to make decisions about the environment and at what scales. 
Those who resist extractive industries in Guatemala – most commonly the rural poor and 
indigenous people - demand access to environmental decision-making arenas, using an 
array of formal and informal strategies to pry open the political spaces they have 
historically been excluded from. These actors challenge dominant and hegemonic ideas 
about participation, about what constitutes as appropriate human-environment relations, 
and about how the state works and for whom. These conflicting and contradictory notions 
surrounding corporate-community conflicts are reflected in the discourses of the private 
sector, which appears to remain resistant to ideas about more inclusive environmental 
governance. It is evident, even as the private sector emphasizes the role of institutions 
and the role of law in environmental governance, that the practices of the most powerful 
members of the elite have changed little. The private sector continues to be linked to 
illegal financing of political campaigns of (allegedly) corrupt politicians. The killings of 
human rights defenders, and environmental and indigenous rights activist, continue to 
rise, and the military has once again strengthened its position within the state apparatus 
(Bull & Aguilar-Støen, 2019, p. 134).  
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Chapter six: Conclusion 
In the dissertation I focus my analytical gaze on corporate-community conflicts 
around extractive industries in Guatemala to examine the ways in which environmental 
struggles emerge and take shape. I use environmental governance as a framework to 
analyze the processes, institutions, actors, discourses that shape the conditions of 
possibility of political action and mobilization in environmental struggles. I argue that to 
understand the conditions of possibility of political action and mobilization in 
environmental struggles we must study the interplay between political actions ‘from 
above’ and ‘from below,’ which I see as dialectically interrelated, with dynamic and 
contested interactions between actors within and between scales. Environmental struggles 
are part of emergent forms of scalar politics wherein different actors struggle to 
(re)consolidate power and authority in the hands of competing groups. The complex ways 
in which corporate-elite-government-military networks shape political actions in 
environmental conflicts intersects with the strategies of grassroots movements, who 
themselves are engaged in multi-scalar contentious politics. Spatialities shape the 
conditions of possibility for political action. They matter for the imaginaries, material 
practices and emergent trajectories of environmental struggles. By examining the shifting 
spatialities of political actions we can reveal the articulations of emergent power relations 
and make visible some of the power geometries in environmental struggles.
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 Paul Robbins (2004) said that to understand uneven development, unjust social 
relations, and socio-ecological distribution conflicts, we must ground these processes 
historically and geographically by tracing the historical processes, legal and institutional 
infrastructures, and socially implicated assumptions and discourses that typically make 
unjust outcomes the rule rather than the exception, which is precisely what I have tried to 
do in this dissertation.  
1. Summary of main findings and arguments 
The first article, “This is not a game”: Shaping political actions ‘from above’ in 
environmental conflicts in Guatemala, examined the interplay between political actions 
from above and below in extractive conflicts. In the paper, we analyse how the private 
sector and the government respond to opposition against extractive industries. Responses 
include tactics and strategies that range from criminalisation and violent repression of 
activism to publicity campaigns and lobbying. However, we observe that the ways in 
which social movements resist also influence responses ‘from above,’ e.g. legal and 
technical contestations to environmental and social standards, community referendums, 
civil disobedience etc.  
We contend that the private sector and government engage in practices that aim to 
undermine and suppress opposition to extractive industries, and to make extractive 
operations politically and socially legitimate. Activists are increasingly portrayed in the 
same way as adversaries during the civil war, justifying counterinsurgency and repression 
against them, while paradoxically, corporations claim commitment to international 
human rights standards, such as the ILO’s Convention 169, and to engage in ‘community 
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development’ and ‘social responsibility.’ The frequent use of violence in response to 
mining opposition suggest that the private sector and the government are less interested 
in neutralizing resistance through concessions and forms of compromise, but instead opt 
for the explicit exclusion and marginalization of oppositional forces by various 
mechanisms ranging from discursive and legal structures to outright violence and 
repression.  
The second article, From the streets to the courts: Mobilizing the law to subvert 
hegemonic power relations in environmental struggles, examines the growing importance 
of law, legal institutions and legal actors in anti-mining struggles, analyzing both why 
and how environmental activists mobilize through ‘legal’ forms of political action. We 
find that people affected by mining related environmental injustices resist their exclusion 
from environmental decision-making by creating ‘hybrid mechanisms for participation’, 
such as community consultations, and by challenging dominant notions of ‘participation’ 
through their contestation of EIAs and technocratic, market-driven ideas about FPIC. 
In analyzing the evolving political actions of anti-mining movements, we find that 
environmental activists challenge dominant notions of ‘participation’ through their 
contestations of technocratic EIAs and market-driven ideas about FPIC. They do so to 
obtain recognition and to assert the rights of affected communities to self-determination 
in environmental decision-making processes, and to unsettle the legitimacy of dominant 
ideas about development and human-environment relations. One of the most powerful 
ways in which environmental activists are able to challenge their exclusion from 
environmental decision-making arenas is by generating grassroots driven forms of 
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governance practices, such as community referendums, which have become one of the 
most common tools for resisting mining development in Guatemala.  
The third article, Corporate community conflicts in Guatemala: Exploring private 
sector perspectives on opposition to mining, explored the discourses of Guatemalan 
business leaders and economic elites in order to analyze how the private sector explains 
and understands corporate-community mining conflicts in the country.  
An analysis of how the private sector explains and understands corporate-
community mining conflicts reveals that the private sector is increasingly concerned 
about the role of the state, institutions and the law in environmental governance, as well 
as the interference of environmental NGOs and ‘third-party actors.’  
The discourse of the private sector should be understood in the context of 
emergent forms of scalar politics where different actors struggle to consolidate power and 
authority in the hands of competing groups. Those who resist extractive industries in 
Guatemala – most commonly the rural poor and indigenous people - demand access to 
environmental decision-making arenas, using an array of formal and informal strategies 
to pry open the political spaces they have historically been excluded from. These actors 
challenge dominant and hegemonic ideas about participation, about what constitutes as 
appropriate human-environment relations, and about how the state works and for whom. 
These conflicting and contradictory notions surrounding corporate-community conflicts 
are reflected in the discourses of the private sector, which appears to remain resistant to 
ideas about more inclusive environmental governance 
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2. Future research and final remarks  
There is so much more that I would have liked to include in this dissertation, but 
cannot – because of time, space, my sanity. There is so much more to be said about 
environmental struggles in Guatemala, and this dissertation offers only the tiniest of 
glimpses into an incredibly complicated, multifaceted situation.   
The articles in this dissertation are just a starting point. At a later point in time I 
would like to write another paper that builds on the framework laid out in the second 
article of this dissertation - From the streets to the courts: Mobilizing the law to subvert 
hegemonic power relations in environmental struggles. One of the main findings in that 
article is the context of criminalization, repression and violence that arises with the 
emergence of community consultations or ‘hybrid mechanisms for participation.’ To 
further substantiate this finding empirically I would like to examine the extraordinary 
escalation measures taken by the state and the private sector in attempts to hinder 
consultation processes from taking place in the Departments of Santa Rosa and Jalapa. 
Such a paper would also further substantiate the findings of the first paper in my 
dissertation - “This is not a game”: Shaping political actions ‘from above’ in 
environmental conflicts in Guatemala – to further emphasize that these processes of 
ongoing contestations about environmental governance reflect emergent scalar politics 
about who gets to make decisions about the environment.  
There are several avenues that I wish to pursue in my future research. I intend to 
continue my engagement with research on socio-environmental conflicts in Guatemala 
and Central America. I think that it may be particularly interesting to continue examining 
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the interplay between legal arenas and environmental contestations from a political 
ecology perspective. In studying environmental struggles, political ecology as a field, 
with its focus on informal and extra-legal dynamics, has paid far too little attention to 
legal geographies that are central to environmental conflicts in many places. I wish to 
address these lacunae by further developing my research on the judicialization of 
environmental struggles, in Central America, as well as in other parts of the Global South 
and the Global North.  
I am also very interested in expanding my future research to include research on 
the political ecologies of environmental struggles and resource extraction in North 
America, and ultimately adding a comparative component to my current research. I am 
particularly interested in exploring the environmental politics of pipeline development 
and energy infrastructure in the United States and Canada, for example examining the 
social and environmental impacts of projects like the Dakota Access Pipeline, the 
Keystone Pipeline System and the Enbridge Pipeline.  I recall following the conflict 
surrounding the Dakota Access Pipeline as it was unfolding in 2016 and being taken 
aback by many of the parallels with what I have observed in Guatemala. This sparked an 
interest in expanding my future research to include research on the politics of 
environmental struggles and resource extraction in North America.    
One thing I am sure of: wherever the future takes me, Guatemala will always be 
with me. Guatemala – Iximulew – país de eterna primavera, you have touched me to the 
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